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Seven years later, international  debt strategy has not moved
beyond  crisis  management.  If conditions  worsen,  the political
obstacles  to formal,  involuntary  debt  forgiveness  may  have  to be
removed.
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dPlcy, Planning,  and Rosearch
Debt  and International  K.nance
This comprehensive review of debt strategies  ments tend to gloss over the increasing politici-
includes recent debt proposals that recommend  zation of the problem in debtor countries them-
alternatives to market-based debt workouts.  selves.
Proposals differ widely depending on whether
they seek new lending or broad-based debt relief  So far creditors have stayed one step ahead
and forgiveness.  Their common, explicit aim is  of the debtors.  Banks have trimmed their expo-
to reduce the negative net resource transfers to  sures and accumulated large provisions to
the creditors and to ease the debt burden of the  reduce their vulnerability to defaults; creditors
highly indebted countries.  have increasingly recognized the pragmatism of
selective voluntary debt reduction: industrial
Commercial creditors and official circles in  countries and mult:lateral agencies have stepped
industrial countries have so far shunned the idea  in with sizeable emergency loans and lending
of interest concessions or debt forgiveness to  commitments to deal with isolated crises with
hiighly  indebted countries.  Governments have a  individual debtors (most recently in Mexico and
political problem using public funds ("taxpay-  Argentina). The intemational community has
ers' money") to finance debt concessions and/or  raised the stakes as needed but after seven years
to protect banks from country defaults, particu-  the debt strategy has not yet moved beyond
larly in an environment of budgetary austerity.  crisis management.
Banks fear that large-scale involuntary debt
reduction would entail substantial write-offs  If Latin American debtors revive the idea of
which - if thcy exceeded existing loss provi-  a "debtor cartel," or if social or economic
sions and eroded capital - could harm highly  conditions worsen (with a world recession, for
leveraged banks.  There is also ideological  example), crisis management may no longer
resistance to the idea of resolving a "market"  suffice.  A purely political decision may then be
problem - debt recovery by private commercial  necessary to remove obstacles to formal, invol-
banks - by nonmarket means.  And both  untary debt forgiveness. The amount to be
official and market creditors point to the risk of  forgiven under such conditions could tum out to
moral hazard - that formal concessions would  be higher than if more timely action had been
"reward bad conduct," penalizing countries that  taken.
have persevered with adjustment.  These argu-
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I. The  Debt  Crisis  in Perspective
Mexico's  announcement,  in August 1982,  that it would be unable  to
continue  to  service its external  debt of $86 billion triggered  the debt
crisis. At that time,  Mexico's  debt  had reached  the  equivalent  of 53  percent
of its CNP,  and of more than 310 percent  of export  earnings. The proximate
cause  of Mexico's  near default  was the rapid rise in the real cost of debt
service  during  the  preceding  years. Real  interest  rates  on external  reached  a
peak of close to 25 percent  in 1982.  1 That burden severely  eroded the
country's  debt-service  capability  in an environment  of global  global  economic
recession,  falling  oil  prices  and  unfavorable  export  prospects.
The  US Treasury  immediately  came  to  Mexico's  rescue  with  a $1  billion
prepayment  for future  oil imports,  supplemented  by a $925 million  bridging
loan.  A second  bridging  loan of equal amount  was provided  by the Bank for
International  Settlements  (BIS). This combined  package  gave  the  country  time
to negotiate an adj-istment  program with the IMF and to arrange for the
rescheduling  of a part  of its  commercial  debt.
While Mexico's  negotiations  with its bank advisory  committee  were
under way--they  took almost one year to complete--changing  perceptions  of
country  risks  induced  credit  contamination  that  caused  a drastic  reduction  in
the volume of commercial  lending to highly-indebted  developing  c9 yntries.
From 1982 to 1983 net disbursements  of long-term  commercial  fuds  - to the
seventeen  highly-indebted  middle-income  countries--the  HICs  ---dropped by
some  60 percent,  from $28  billion  to $12 billion.  After  total  debt service
payments  of  $48 billion--including  $29 billion in interest--in  1983, the
decline  of new lending  changed the direction  of net resource  transfers  to
those  countries. A net inflow  of $3.7 billion  in 1982 became  an outflow  of
$10 billion in 1983. (Table 1)  As most HICs were using new credits to
refinance  debt falling due, the emergence  of negative resource  transfers
spread  illiquidity  and  generalized  the  debt  crisis  among  the  largest  debtors.
1/ One  of the  more conventional  methods  to calculate  real  interest  rates  is
to  deflate  nominal  interest  rates  by the  unit  price  of the  debtor's
exports.  Using  that  method  to  deflate  US dollar  LIBOR,  the  developing
countries'  real  borrowing  costs  in  dollars  rose  from  -7 percent  in 1980  to
+15  percent  in  1981,  and  +23  percent  in 1982. That increase  was caused  by
the  combination  of anti-inflationary  monetary  policies  in  industrial
countries  (rising  nominal  rates)  and  falling  commodity  prices  (falling
cost  deflator).
2/  Bank  loans  and  new  foreign  and international  bond issues.
3/  In the  World  Bank's  classification  these  seventeen  countries  are:
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d'Ivoire,
Ecuador,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Peru,  the  Philippines,
lUruguay,  Venezuela  and  Yugoslavia.-2-
That crisis,  which is now in its seventh  year,  has left  its  mark on
all problem  debtors  and has acquired  geopolitical  dimensions.  Since 1982
virtually  all HICs have experienced  low GDP growth, declining investment
ratios  and  falling  living  standards  that  have rolled  back  much  of the  progress
of previous  decades.  Per capita  income  in most HICs is lower  today  than in
1980, and absolute poverty and  malnutrition  are  again reaching alarming
levels.  Even in 1988,  when the HICs' real CDP growth  reached  2 percent--
compared  with an average  of 0.8 percent  from 1980  to 1986--per  capita  income
continued  to decline. These  circumstances  explain  why  adjustment  and  economic
reform  have  generally  been  fitful  and  uneven,  and fraught  with  domestic  social
and  political  tensions.
Table  1: Highly  Indebted  Countries  and  the  World  Economy,  1980-88
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  c/
Percentage  real  change
Economic  rcowth  Indicators
Industrial  Country  Output  1.3  2.0  -0.4  2.8  4.5  3.1  2.7  3.3  3,9
World  Trade  a/  1.3  2.4  -1.0  3.0  9.9  4.0  2.6  4.3  7.5
HIC  GOP  b/  5.6  0.6  -0.4  -2.9  1.9  3.7  3.4  1.7  2.0
HIC  Investment  b/  9.4  0.4 -13.1  -21.0  -2.1  4.5  1.9  0.8  -2.9
HIC  Per  Capita  Consumption  b/  3.4  0.3  -2.2  -4.1  -1.7  0.2  2.6  -1.4  -0.6
HIC  Exports  b/  1.1  -6.6  0.0  5.0  9.3  2.2  0.7  0.4  6.4
HIC  Imports  b/  8.2  2.3 -14.1  -20.4  -1.1  -1.6  4.0  -1.7  2.0
USS  billion
Total  External  Debt  289.0  351.0  391.0  422.0  438.0  454.0  482.0  527.0  529.0
Net  Flows  to  HICs  28.6  43.7  34.6  19.1  13.3  6.0  4.5  6.2  7.6
Net  Transfers  to  HICs  d/  8.8  18.3  3.7  -9.9 -19.9  -26.5  -25.8  -21.8  -31.1
a/ Volume.
b/ Constant  1980  US  dollars.
cl  Preliminary  estimates.
d/ Net  resource  transfers  are  defined  as  the  difference  tetrwoen  new  lending  and  total  debt
service  (interest  and  principal  repayments).
Source:  World  Debt  Tables  1988-89
By comparison,  expansion  in the industrial  countries  is already  in
its  sixth  year--the  longest  period  of uninterrupted  peacetime  growth. In 1988
that growth exceeded  all expectations,  accelerating  to 3.9 percent.  The
undertone  of world  trade  is  equally  buoyant  with  an estimated  volume  growth  of
about  7  percent  in 1988.- 3 -
The stark contrast  of economic  trends  in industrial  countries  and
HICs--rising  prosperity  in  the  former,  falling  living  standards  in the  latter-
-underscores  the impact  of the debt crisis  in debtor  countries  and points  to
shortcomings  in the debt strategy  that  has evolved  since 1982. It has been
successful  in  preventing  large-scale  defaults  and  preserving  the stability  of
the  international  financial  system. But  success  has been  one-sided  as little
has been  done to accommodate  the debtors'  continuing  financing  needs.  Three
general  observations  come  to mind.
0  Cuts in domestic  absorption,  declining  investment  ratios  and forced
austerity--all  of which were necessary  to maintain  some degree  of
debt service  in an environment  of negative  resource  transfers--have
delinked  the  HICs'  growth  from  that  in the industrial  nations. From
1983  to 1988  the  HICs'  GDP  grew  by an average  of  only 1.8  percent,  or
about  half that of industrial  countries. This compares  with growth
rates  in excess  6 percent,  twice  those  of industrial  countries,  from
1970  to 1982.  (see  Table  1)  Consistent  strong  growth  in  HICs  during
the decade preceding the  debt crisis shows that the post-1974
commercial  recycling  of OPEC surpluses  to developing  countries  had
acted as a growth  multiplier. That was even the case in countries
that subsequently  became  problem  debtors  because  they had failed  to
channel foreign  borrowings  into productive  investments. Moreover,
until 1981 low or negative  real interest  rates  made it deceptively
easy  to service  a rising  external  debt.
0  In contrast  with their  commercial  creditors,  the debtors  have been
unable--and  generally  reluctant--to  form  a cartel. Negotiations  with
foreign  creditors  have invariably  involved  one country  at-a-time.
Commercial  banks, on  the  other hand,  immediately  formed strong
coalitions  to  deal  with  problem  debtors. Since  1983  all  bank  lending
to  HICs  hasl been  concerted and  coordinated by  bank  advisory
committees.  4/  Coordinated  action  has strengthened  the creditors'
bargaining  position  in debt rescheduling  negotiations  and kept new
lending  to the strict  minimum required  to refiinance  a portion of
interest  due and maintain  loans in performing  status.  Most banks
have also  been able  to accumulate  large  precautionary  loss  reserves,
beyond  those  that  had been  mandated  by regulators,  and have trimmed
their  risk  exposures  in  HICs.
0  Last,  but  not  least,  the  unexpectedly strong performance of
industrial  countries in  1987 and  1988 does not  mean  that the
recessionary  phase of the current  business  cycle can be postponed
indefinitely. Although  that risk is slimmer  now than in 1987,  the
global  economy  could still  fall prey to a recession. In that case
4/  In their  negotiations  with  debtors,  the  commercial  banks  are  represented
by  an advisory  committee  that  comprises  the  largest  creditors. As these
negotiations  often  take  place  in  London,  bank  advisory  committees  are
usually  referred  to  as the  "London  Club".-4-
the external environment  for developing  countries could be very
similar to that which triggered  the debt crisis of  1982: export
volumes and revenues  would fall, terms of trade worsen and real
interest  rates  rise.  Coming  after  several  years  of slow  growth,  such
a situation  could lead to the suspension  of debt service  by most
HICs.
Concern  about the economic  decline  of the HICs and about the  risks
their  chronic  debt  overhang  _I  still  poses  to the international  community  has
motivated  several  ambitious  proposals  that  set  out  alternatives  to the  current
market-based  debt strategies. Several  debt proposals  reviewed  in this  paper
argue  that  market-based  formulas  are  inherently  biased  against  the  debtors  and
that  the  stebility  of the  international  financial  system  has been  preserved  at
their expense.  They point to the economic  decline in HICs, where large
negative  resource  transfers  have caused  hardship  and contributed  to the  lack
of adjustment.  A number of proposals  go further,  and stress  the need to
defuse  social  and political  tensions  in debtor  countries,  especially  in Latin
America,  where debt-related  problems  are increasingly  threatening  fragile
democracies.
The focus  on negative  resource  transfers  is particularly  justified
when they  occur  after  years  of declining  living  standards  or, as is the  case
of most HICs,  before  the basis  for  resumed  growth  has been  established.  Most
debt proposals  therefore  seek to restore  positive  resource  transfers  to the
debtor countries,  but often differ in their individual  approaches.  Some
proposals  offer formulas  to stimulate  new lending;  others advocate  large-
scale,  unilateral  debt forgiveness;  others  still  seek to combine  new lending
and  debt  relief.
Following  this  introduction,  Section  2 reviews  how the  debt strategy
has  evolved  since  the  1985  Baker  initiative.  Section  3 assesses  the  potential
for  a sustained  expansion  of  market-based  voluntary  debt  reduction. Section  4
provides  a taxonomy  of debt plans  that propose  alternatives  to market-based
apprcaches. Section  5 sets  out  basic  criteria  for  the  evaluation  of the  debt
plans  that  are  reviewed  in the  next section. Conclusions  are  presented  in  the
last  section.
5/  A debt  overhang  can  be defined  as a burden  of  external  debt  and  debt
service  that  reduces  incentives  to  adjustment,  and  can,  in fact,  hinder
the  adjustment  process.- 5 -
II.  The  Evolution  of Debt  Workouts  since  the  Baker  Initiative
The Baker  initiative  of September  1985  formalized  the  consensus  that
the  only  way  to resolve  the  HICs'  debt  overhanF  would  be to combine  adjustment
with growth, rather than forced  austerity.  o  To promote  both goals the
initiative  called  for increased  lending--in  a total  amount  of $29  billion--by
commercial  creditors  and  multilateral  agencies,  to be disbursed  over the  next
three  years.
It is now clear that the result  of policies  and programs  based  on
that initiative  is,  at best,  mixed.  For many  heavily  indebted  countries  the
outcome  of the debt crisis  remains  as uncertain  as in 1982,  particularly  in
cases  where  the  sheer  size  of debt  service  obligations  continues  to  exceed  the
capacity--or  willingness--to  pay.
O  With hindsight,  the initiative's  targets  for new lending  were too
modest.  Moreover, actual new  lending has failed to meet those
targets. For  instance,  in 1988  new  money  commitments  from  commercial
banks  were still  only a modest  $7.5 billion--including  $5.2  billion
to Brazil--and  covered  only  partial  refinancing  of interest  due.
o  The HICs'  debt  burden  has  nevertheless  continued  to rise.  In  dollar
equivalents,  their  total external  debt has increased  by 21 percent
since 1985, reaching  $527 billion  in 1988.  Admittedly,  given the
large  component of  non-dollar debt,  that  increase is  largely
attributable to  currency valuation effects resulting from  the
devaluation  of the  US dollar  since  early  1985.  (One  way of  measuring
the impact  of currency  valuation  effects  is to convert  end-of-year
dollar debt stocks into a  composite currency  unit, such as the
SDRs.  On  that basis, the total external  debt of HICs actually
declined  from  SDR413  billion  in 1985,  to SDR392  billion  in 1987.)
O  Excluding  arrears, HICs have made debt service payments  of $146
billion--or  more than 6 percent  of their  combined  GNP--during  the
1985-87  period,  and their  total  net  resource  transfers  7  to foreign
long-term  creditors  reached  $74  billion  (Figure  1).
O  Despite  considerable  efforts--including ill-fated  "heterodox"
stabilization  programs  in Brazil and Argentina  (the "Cruzado"  and
"Austral" plans)--success  in  containing inflation and  pursuing
adjustment  has  been  limited. Indeed,  a number  of Latin-American  HICs
still  suffer  from  hyperinflation.
6/  The  Baker  Initiative  singled  out  fifteen  highly-indebted  countries,  "the
Baker  15",  for  priority  action. That  group  includes  all  HICs,  except
Jamaica  and  Costa  Rica.
7/  Net  resource  transfers  become  negative  when total  debt service--prinicipal
repayments  and  interest  payments--exceeds  the  amount  of new  lending.0  In most  HICs,  gross  investment  remains  well below  the  levels  reached
before  the outbreak  of the debt crisis.  Preliminary  estimates  are
that,  in 1988,  gross  investment  in those  17 countries  was only  about
three  quarters  of the 1979-81  average.  The reason  for  this is that
the  burden  of net resource  transfers  to foreign  creditors  has fallen
mainly on  productive  investment:  the decrease in investment  is
roughly  equal to the amount  of net resource  transfers.  In other
words, inadequate  investment  levels are, to a large degree, the
result  of declining  support  from  commercial  creditors. In addition,
as insufficient  investment  prolongs the cycle of low growth, it
creates  a  vicious  circle  where  poor  performance  and  low
creditworthiness  continue  to  discourage  new lending.
Economic  progress  and  adjustment  in the  HICs  have also  been  hindered
by an unfavorable  trading  environment  and by recurring  external  shocks. Both
factors  have affected  the  debtors'  export  performance  and  ability  to service
debt:
o  The resurgence  of protectionism  in industrial  countries,  especially
non-tariff  barriers that have a  strong  bias against imports  from
developing  countries,  have hurt debtors  that had to generate  trade
surpluses  to service  their  debt.
O  Until  1987,  weak  or declining  commodity  prices  continued  to  erode  the
terms  of trade  and export  revenues  of several  HICs:  the 1986  drop in
oil prices  was severely  destabilizing  for oil-producing  countries,
such as Ecuador,  Mexico,  Nigeria  and Venezuela;  the  weakening  price
of tropical  beverages  was particularly  harmful for countries  like
C6te  d'Ivoire.
0  The initial  impact  of high real interest  rates 8/ on external  debt
was  compounded by  currency  valuation effects  (the  post-1984
devaluation  of the US dollar)  as the growth  of export  revenues  (in
dollars)  lagged  behind  the  rate  of dollar  debt  accretion  until  1987
The lack of tangible  progress  to-date  can been measured  from the
trend  for the two  main indicators  of relative  debt burdens--the  debt-service
ratio and debt-export  ratio.  In 1988 the HICs had an average  debt service
ratio--based  on total  debt--of  35.5  percent,  or only  marginally  below  that  of
38.8 percent  in 1982 (Table  2).  Admittedly,  that  debt ratio  had dropped  to
below  31 percent  in 1987.  But, as debt service  is  measured  on a cash  basis,
that improvement  was mostly  due to large  interest  arrears,  notably  by Brazil
after  its  suspension  of interest  payments  in  February  of that  year. This  also
explains  the apparent  paradox  that Brazil's  payment  of 1987 interest  arrears
in 1988  actually  contributed  to a worsening  of the  average  debt-service  ratio
in  that  year.
8/  Using  the  export  price  cost  deflator,  real  dollar  interest  rates  have
consistently  exceeded  10  percent  from  1980  through  1986.-7-
The second  measure  of the  HICs'  continuing  debt  servicing  problems  is
that the ratio of total debt to exports (their  primary source  of foreign
exchange  to service  external  debt)  has risen  by close  to 40 percent,  from  259
percent  in 1982 to 357 percent  in 1987.  Although  preliminary  estimates  are
that  that  ratio  dropped  to 293 percent  in 1988,  that  improvement  reflects  the
impact  of special  factors.
0  The first  factor  is purely  exogenous,  namely  the  appreciation  of the
dollar during the  first nine months of  1988.  This has  partly
reversed  the earlier  effect  of a weakening  dollar  and brought  down
the  dollar  value  of debt  denominated  in other  currencies.
0  As  is  discussed below, voluntary debt  reduction by  commercial
creditors  is gaining  ground,  and is slowing  down the rate of debt
accretion.
0  Considerable adjustment efforts, and  diversification  into non-
traditional  exports  have enabled  the two  largest  debtors,  Brazil  and
Mexico,  strongly  to improve  their  export  performance  and revenues  in
1987 and  1988.  The  size of both countries'  debt and  exports,
relative to those of the other HICs, has  lowered that group's
combined debt-export  ratio and  hides  the  continued poor export
performance  of other  countries.
However,  the generally  disappoin  ing performance  of HICs contrasts
with the  experience  of other  developing  countries,  in particular  those  in East
Asia.  Those countries were more  successful  in  adjusting to  the  same
unfavorable  external  environment  and were able to raise export  revenues  and
increase  the purchasing  power  of their  exports  throughout  the 1980s.  Their
greater  adaptability  to changing  conditions  in the world economy  highlights
the  importance  of flexible  responses  and sound  economic  policies.
Protracted  uncertainty  about the outcome of  the debt crisis is
reflected  in average  discounts  of  more  than  50 percent  in  the  secondary  market
for HIC debt.  That uncertainty  also explains  why  commercial  creditors  and
the debtor  countries  continue  to pursue  diverging  objectives  in their debt
negotiations.  Whereas  the  debtors'  usual  goal  is to  obtain  new  credits  and  to
"egain  time",  their  creditors  aim to keep debt service  as current  as possible
and to trim  risk exposures--in  absolute  terms  and relative  to share  capital.
Moreover,  banks  will remain  unwilling  to resume  voluntary  lending  to problem
debtors  until stronger  growth improves  their perceived  creditworthiness  and
translates  into  smaller  discounts  in  the  secondary  loan  market.- 8 -
Table  2:  Key Debt Indicators,  1985-88
(Percentage)
Debt  Service  Ratio  a/  Debt-Export  Ratio  a/
1985  1986  1987  1988  b/  1985  1986  1987  1988  bl
Developing  Countries  23.1  24.6  22.6  21.5  163.5 189.0 180.7 170.0
Low-income  Countries  12.7  14.8  14.0  14.5  156.7 177.1 182.1 180.0
Middle-income  Countries  24.8  26.3  24.5  23.0  164.5 190.8 182.2 175.0
Memorandum  Items
Sub-Saharan  Africa  24.2  21.7  18.4  20.5  191.8 273.4 307.6 315.0
HiCs  33.3  36.7  30.6  35.5  146.3 308.8 309.9 295.0
a/ Debt  ratios  are  based  on long-term  debt  and  associated  service  payments  (on  a  cash  basis)  and
do not include  short-term  debt  or arrears.
b/ Preliminary  estimates.
Source: World  Debt  Tables  1988-89
The  reason  for  this  i3  obvious. Even  the  larger  banks  with  long-term
commitments  to developing  countries  face difficult  choices. On the  one  hand,
their  collective  interest  would  be to step  up "defensive"  lending,  provided  a
relaxation  of  the  financing constraint in  major debtors can  stimulate
investment  and  promote growth.  This would  lower  the  risk  of  future
interruptions  of  debt service and  improve the quality of existing loan
assets. On the  other  hand,  it is  also  in each  bank's  interest  not  to take  the
lead,  as even the largest  lenders  could  have  only a marginal  effect  on total
resource  flows to any given HIC.  The implicit  value any new loan would
therefore immediately  fall  to  the  level of  prevailing secondary-market
prices. That situation  replicates  the  "no  collusion"  prisoners'  dilemma.
That dilemma is reinforced  bv the gradual erosion of the banks'
consensus  in support  of a concerted  strategy. The  banks'  business  strategies
vis-a-vis  HICs now vary widely,  depending  on relative  exposure  levels,  the
ability to  accumulate sufficient loss  provisions and  opportunities  to
diversify  activities  in the  global  finar-ial  market.  Creditor  attitudes  are
also  influenced  by  national  regulatory  v  tax  regimes  that  govern  the  tax  and
capitalization  status  of loan  loss  provisions.
These  considerations  have  reduced  the  number  of active  creditors. By
and  large,  only  major  international  banks  with  multinational  corporate  clients-9-
and  branch  or subsidiary  networks  in  HICs  remain  willing  to  preserve  long-term
commercial  relations  with them and are now virtually  their sole source  of
trade  finance  and  other  forms  of short-term  credit. To keep  existing  loans  in
a performing  status  these larger  creditors  explore innovative  market-based
debt workouts, including voluntary debt reduction in selected  countries.
Smaller,  less exposed banks are less accommodating. During the heyday  of
commercial  lending  to developing  countries  these  banks,  including  several  US
regionals,  had builL  up LDC loan  portfolios  by participating  in international
syndicates  arranged  by their  larger  counterparts. After 1982,  these  second-
string  lenders became reluctant to  participate in  debt  reschedulings,
expecting  to be repaid  out of the proceeds  of the others  banks'  new loans.
That attitude  became  known as "free riding".  Now most small  banks put a
priority  on winding down their HIC loan portfolios,  even at the cost of
substantial  write-offs.  The easiest  w1y out for  them is to accept  "exit"
bonds  whenever  there  are  reschedulings.
The  divergence  uf the  banks'  and the  debtors'  goals,  and the  lack  of
sufficient  financing  has also generated  considerable  tensions,  especially  in
countries  that  already  face  strong  internal  political  and social  opposition  to
taxing  adjustment  and austerity.  A clear illustration  is provided  by Latin
American  debtors  whose commitment  to such programs  is occasionally  flagging
under the pressure  of mounting  domestic  opposition. Moreover,  as the debt
problem  becomes  increasingly  politicized,  tensions  can escalate  to the point
of provoking  confrontational  attitudes  towards  commercial  creditors. These
can take the form  of protracted  payment  arrears  and occasioral  interruptions
of debt service. Peru's  decision  in 1985  to limit  debt  service  to 10  percent
of export  revenues,  and Brazil's  suspension,  in February  1987,  of the  service
of its  medium  and  long-term  commercial  debt  are  two  good  examples.
Despite this generally somber assessment,  developments in  1988
pointed  to, at least temporary,  improvement. First,  there  was a return  to
more conciliatory  attitudes  between  debtors  and creditors.  In November  of
that year Brazil  was able to obtain  a substantial  financing  package  from  its
commercial  creditors,  ended  the  moracorium  on interest  payments  that  had been
declared in early  1987, and  cleared its interest arrears to  commercial
banks.  There was also expectation  of progress  in Peru and Argentina,  even
though  severe  problems  continue  to  affect  their  near-term  prospects. Peru  has
adopted  a set of austerity  measures  and is gradually  resuming  negotiations
with its creditors  to find ways to settle  arrears. Argentina  has started  to
settle  some  of its  interest  arrears  and  has  besun  discussions  with  the  IMF  and
commercial  banks  on  an economic  adjustment  program.
9/  Exit  bonds  are  one  of the  menu  options  that  aims  to  deal  with  free
riding. These  bonds  are  normally  long-term  and  carry  below-market
yields. To compensate  for  that  sacrifice,  these  bonds  are  excluded  from
the  base  for  future  concerted  lending. For  the  remaining  creditors  this
offers  the  prospect  of more  expeditious  future  negotiations,  albeit  at the
cost  of potentially  larger  lending  commitments.  To the  debtors  exit  bonds
offer  low-cost,  long-term  rescheduling  of part  of their  external
liabilities.- 10  -
Secondly  large  commercial creditors increasingly promote debt
conversion  and voluntary  debt reduction  ,VDR).  As a large  part of VDR is
transacted  in the secondary  market for loans,  turnover  in that market  has
risen  substantially.  For 1988  as a whole,  total  turnover,  including  interbank
trading,  is estimated  at around $36 billion.  VDR clauses  have also been
included  in recent  agreements  between  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  and Mexico  and
their  commercial  creditors.  The growing  volume  of VDR, through  debt-equity
swaps  and  debt repurchases  has enabled  a number  of debtors  to  capture  some  of
the  secondary  loan  market's  discounts.
Nevertheless, activity  remains  concentrated in  the  debts  of
Argentina,  Brazil, Chile and Mexico.  These four countries  account for 90
percent  of all  secondary-market  transactions  and  debt  conversion  to-date. For
the other debtors the asymmetry the between heavily-discounted  secondary-
market  prices  for their  debt and the contractual  value  of their  debt-service
obligations  remains  an aggravating  fact  as they  have generally  been  unable  to
take advantage  cf prevailing  discounts. The reason  for this this is that a
debtor's  unilateral  repurchase  of part  of its  debt (a  "buyback")  is the  legal
equivalent  of prepayment.  "Sharing  provisions"  that are customary  in loan
agreements  usually prevent such buvbacks.  10/.  This explains  why market
discounts  can generally  only be passed  through  to debtors  in the  context  of
debt-reduction  transactions  that are structured  to deal  with legal  problems,
such  as those  that  arise  from  sharing  clauses.
Further  headway  with  VDR  may  broaden  the  emerging  consensus  that  debt
reduction  need  not prevent  future  commercial  lending  if it can  be explicitly
linked  to the borrowers'  adjustment  efforts  and economic  performance.  As
discussed  in the 1988-89  edition  of the  World  Debt Tables,  this  could  set  the
stage for a more pragmatic  debt strategy  that blends  greater  use of VDR by
commercial  banks, renewed adjustment  efforts by debtor countries,  and an
enhanced  catalytic  role  of the  multilateral  financial  institutions.
To be successful,  such  a strategy  would  need to have  a demonstrable
impact  on the level  of negative  resource  transfers  by the  HICs and translate
into higher investment  levels.  Otherwise  it would merely  "buy time" and
ultimately  raise  the  geopolitical  dimensions  of the  debt  crisis.
III. Can  'DR  Be Expanded  Sufficiently  to  Offset  the  Shortfall  in  Lending
The  recent  surge  in the  volume  of VDR  has  made it  a central  tenet  of
the  evolving  debt  strategy. To evaluate  the potential  of sustained  expansion
in the  volume  of market-based  debt reduction,  to the  point  that  it  can  have  a
major  impact  on resource  transfers,  a number  of factors  have to  be taken  into
account.
10/  Sharing  provisions  specify  that  any  prepayment  of part  of  a syndicated
loan  to any  ##?member(s)  of the  syndicate  has to be  "shared"  with the  cther
creditors  in that  syndicate,  unless  they  have  waived  their  right  to share.- 11 -
First of  all, VDR  operations are complex, because they usually
involve  an exchange  of assets  between  a debtor  and participating  creditors.
This  means that  each party should  attach  a greater  value  to the asset  it is
receiving,  than  to that  it is surrendering.  Thus,  if  as is normally  the  case,
VDR involves  a financial  sacrifice,  such  as a lower  contractual  value  of the
assets  that substitute  the creditors'  original  debt claims,  those  new assets
should  be in  a better  risk  category. For  example,  if a loan  is  exchanged  at a
discount  for  negotiable  securities--as  was the  case in  Mexico's  debt  exchange
of February 1988--the  new securities  should  have a greater probability  of
repayment  than the original  loan. Obvi¶mjlly,  if loans are repurchased  for
cash--as  in Bolivia's  1988  debt  buyback  --the  risk-free  nature  of cash  can
make creditors  more  willing  to  consider  larger  discounts.
Reciprocally, debtors  should  feel  that  they  can  exchange or
repurchase  debt for less than its implicit  value.  This implies  an asymmetry
between  the creditors'  subjective  risk evaluation  of the original  asset and
the  debtors'  ability  (or  willingness) to  honor  future  debt-service
obligations.  That  asymmetry  can  prompt  debtors  to  enhance  the  perceived  value
of the  new  asset,  so  as to make the  exchange  attractive  to creditors. Mexico
could do so by offering  US Treasury  zero-coupon  bonds as collateral.  But
other HICs may lack the reserve  cushion  to purchase  such sweeteners,  which
limits  their  room  for  maneuver.
A  further  difficulty  stems from the fact that most debt-reduction
agreement involve three sets of parties: the debtor; creditors  that are
willing to reduce  the debt voluntarily;  and non-participating  creditors.  In
those  settings  non-participants  have  de facto  veto  power  if  there  is  a need  to
amend provisions--such  as sharing  provisions  and negative  pledge  clauses--in
loan  agreements  to  which  they  were party.  Thus,  absent  the  non-participants'
consent  to  waive  those  provisions,  VDR cannot  proceed.
Debt-equity  swaps--one  of the main vehicles  for VDR--also  raise a
number  of issues  that  could  limit  the  spread  of that  formula.
O  The domestic  monetization  of foreign  debt--a  potential  host country
has  to  provide local currency in order to make the  debt swap
possible--tends  to increase  the  domestic  money  supply. Unless  these
monetary  effects are sterilized--for  instance,  by the issuance  of
government  bonds--they  can  further  exacerbate  inflationary  pressures.
These considerations  have prompted  Mexico  to suspend  and Brazil  to
interrupt  their respective  debt-swap  programs  (Brazil  resumed  debt-
equity  swaps  in  early  1989).
11/  Bolivia's  debt  buyback  covered  $335  million  of commercial  debt  (40  percent
of the  total  thereof). It  was  funded  by  donor  governments  in  industrial
countries,  partly  appropriating  ODA funds  that  had  been  earmarked  for
Bolivia. In this  case  banks  accepted  an  average  discount  of 89 percent.- 12  -
O  If debt-equity  swaps are substitutes  for foreign  direct  investment
(FDI) that would have taken place anyway, they subsidize those
investments,  may flaw the allocation  of resources  and amount  to the
loss of a genuine inflow  of foreign  exchange.  In addition,  profit
remittances  to  foreign investors may  eventually create outward
resource  transfers  that  could  exceed  those  on debt  service.
O  Increased  foreign  ownership  and control  of particular  sectors  of the
economy due to debt-equity  swaps can heighten  domestic  political
sensitivities.
O  Any  form of  debt reduction,  including VDR, can create perverse
incentives--the  so-called  "moral  hazard"--for  debtors  to manipulate
market conditions,  so that greater  discounts  help maximize their
gains in a prospective  transaction. As is discussed  later forms.
debt relief proposals are better equipped to deal with it that
problem.
Finally,  significant  increases  in the volume  of VDR are likely  to
require legislative and  regulatory action in  industrial and  developing
countries,  and  more streamlined  negotiation  techniques.  The  last  point  may  be
the easiest,  as greater  experience  and standardized  legal  documentation  are
likely  to bring  about  the  needed  flexibility.
Legislative  action will be more complex.  Useful measures to be
adopted  by industrial  countries  would  include  changes  in  the  definition  of the
banks'  regulatory  capital,  and grester  uniformity  of the tax and accounting
treatment  of loan loss provisions.  Such steps could  make VDR financially
attractive  to a wider group  of banks.  For example,  commercial  banks  may be
more willing to accept sizeable  book losses  on VDR--in line with existing
loan-loss  provisions--if  their regulatory  capital  are not affected  by the
corresponding  writeoffs.
One  approach  that  would  be  particularly  beneficial  to
undercapitalized  banks  /  would  be to permit  them  to spread  their  book  losses
over  time.  An alternative  would  be to enable  banks  to  offset  a part  of their
writeoffs on VDR  with the market value of  foreign assets (investments)
acquired  through  debt-equity  swaps.  Greater  uniformity  in national  tax and
12/  The  gradual  introduction  of uniform  minimum  standard  capital  ratios  by
1992--as  agreed  by the  Basle  Supervisors'  Committee  (the  Cooke
##?Commitee,  under  the  auspices  of the  B.I.S)--is  likely  to influence  the
banks'  lending  behavior  and  ability  to incur  book  losses  on VDR-linked
asset  conversions.  Capital-constrained  banks--such  as several  among  the
U.S.  money-center  banks--that  expect  d,fficulties  in  meeting  the  1992
target  capital-asset  ratio  of  8 percent,  may  be unable  to  absorb  large
writeoffs  on VDR.  Instead,  they  may  favor  to  carry  as long  as possible
general,  unallocated  loan-loss  provisions.  (In  the  U.S.  and  a number  of
other  coutries,  these  provisions  are  currently  counted  as regulatory- 13  -
accounting  regimes  that  govern  the  valuation  of bank assets  and the  treatment
of existing  loan loss provisions  would play an equally  important  role.  By
establishing  a "level  playing  field"  for  creditors  in  different  countries,  it
would  increase  the  number  of banks  that  are  willing  to participate  in  VDR.
Legislation  in the debtor countries,  designed  to facilitate  debt-
equity  swaps  would  have to  complement  action  by the  industrial  countries. For
example,  countries  that  wish to  promote  such  swaps  would  have to  lift  possible
restrictions  on the foreign ownership  or control  of domestic  enterprises.
Appropriate  measures may also be needed to regulate the repatriation  of
investment  revenues, and  to create a  framework for debt auctions.  The
introduction  of  investment  codes or privatization  programs,  to encourage
private-sector  investment,  would  be equally  important.- 14  -
IV.  A Taxonomy  of  Debt  Proposals
Close  to sf  venty  different  debt  plans  have  been  formulated  during  the
last five years  _.  A  common thread among them is the perception  that
existing  debt-workouts  can, at best, maintain  a fragile  status  quo between
creditors  and  debtors,  but  cannot  regenerate  income  growth  in  the  latter.  Most
debt plans  therefore  seek  to create  a less  constraining  financial  environment
for  highly-indebted  countries,  in order to restore  solvency  or, as the case
may be, liquidity. In most cases,  the secondary  aim is to  generate  positive
externalities  for the debtors,  their  creditors  and the  global  economy. The
scope  of these  benefits  is considerable: increased  resource  flows,  supported
by  appropriate economic and  institutional  reforms and  higher domestic
absorption,  could induce  a virtuous  circle of higher  growth in HICs, help
alleviate  the plight  of their poor, and generate  export  opportunities  for
industrial  countries.  Moreover,  as the debtors'  creditworthiness  improves,
the international  financial  system  would  become  more stable  as the  threat  of
further  interruptions  in  the  debt  service  recedes.
To achieve  their respective  goals,  debt proposals  either  recommend
frameworks  des'igned  to stimulate  new lending,  to provide  large-scale  debt
relief,  or to combine  both.  The more ambitious  proposals  would  make debt
relief by  commercial  creditors  quasi-compulsory  by offering  incentives  to
participate  and imposing  penalties  on non-participants.
How  to classify  debt  proposals
Given the  multiplicity  of proposals  that vary in purpose,  scope  and
structure,  a taxonomy  is a useful  guide  to analysis. Classification  criteria
can obviously  be chosen  to suit different  types  of analyses. For  example,  a
legal  analysis  of debt plans  may use  as primary  distinction  whether  ownership
of risk assets remains with the original  creditors  or is transferred  to
another  entity  such as an International  Debt Facility. However,  by putting
debt-equity  swaps  and debt purchases  by an IDF  under the same  heading,  that
classification  would not be suitable  to determine  the comparative  advantages
of either  legal  structure  to  deal  with  specific  types  of debt  overhang.
One difficulty  is that some  criteria  can generate  classifications  of
doubtful  operational  relevance.  For instance,  to rank proposals  by their
principal  beneficiaries  would fail to highlight  the mutuality  of interests
among  interdependent  debtors  and creditors. Lower  debt  burdens,  whether  as a
result  of concessional  interest  rates  or of debt forgiveness,  are likely  to
improve  a debtor's  ability to service  the remaining  debt.  All else being
equal,  this would also raise  the  quality--and  secondary-market  price--of  the
banks'  remaining  risk  assets  in  that  country.
capital.)
13/  Several  proposals  date  back  to 1983,  when  the  financial  markets  still- 15  -
This paper  starts  from  a primary  distinction  between  cases  of "mi
debt  overhang  (debtor  illiquidity)  and  "severe"  debt  overhang  (insolvency)  /
and ranks debt proposals  by their  ability  and effectiveness  in dealing  with
either  type of debt overhang.  That approach  is normative  to the extent  it
considers  that new commercial  lending  at market  terms  could  prove  harmful  in
cases  of severe  debt  overhang,  and that  debt  relief  may  not  be justifiable  for
countries  with  mild  debt  overhangs. In line  with that  approach,  proposals  are
listed  under  the  two  main  headings  of new  money  and  debt  relief.
New money plans are specifically  designed  to restore  liquidity  ini
debtor  countries.  Subject  to the qualifications  that are made in the next
section,  new money is therefore  likely  to be of doubtful  merit in cases  of
severe  debt overhang. However,  countries  that fall into that  category  would
be candidates  for plans  that seek to restore  solvency  through  debt reduction
and  forgiveness.
Some  additional  caveats  are  needed.
o  Several  plans,  espec.ally  those  that  advocate  extensive  debt relief,
seek "globel" solutions  and generalize  their implicit  or explicit
apalytical premises--illiquidity  or  insolvency--to all  problem
debtors  without  distinction. This overlooks  the fact that,  despite
many shared problems, the HICs form a highly diversified  group.
Socio-economic  conditions,  near-term  prospects  and vulnerability  to
changes in the external  environment  differ  widely  among the HICs.
For example,  a drop in oil prices  harms  major  oil exporters  such  as
Nigeria or Mexico,  but helps oil-importing  countries  like Brazil,
Chile  and the  Philippines.
O  Global proposals  to step up lending  or redi'ce  debt stocks  without
regard to the countries'  individual  circumstances,  could  also lack
effectiveness  in attempting  to solve  problems  with the  wrong tool--
such as more lending  to insolvent  countries--and  make it improbable
that consensus  can be reached among constituencies  with diverging
interests.
O  Certain  proposals  fall  in  the  hybrid  category  of  "debt  stabilization"
Debt  stabilization can  help  debtors  with  mild  overhangs to
accommodate  larger  debt levels  and is, therefore,  a de facto  subset
of new  money.  But it can  also be structured  to reduce  the  burden  of
debt service  and  become  a channel  for  debt relief  in cases  of severe
debt problems. For reasons  of convenience  this  taxanomy  treats  debt
stabilization  plans  as a subset  of  new  money  plans.
expected  that  an orderly  resolution  of the  debt  crisis.
14/  For  a technical  definition  types  of debt  types  overhang,  see  I.Diwan  and
S.  Claessens;  Conditionality  and  Debt  Relief,  unpublished  conference- 16  -
0  Finally,  as debt problems  and the global  conjuncture  have evolved
since  1982,  some  of the  earlier  proposals  have  become  obsolete.
New  money  plans
These plans aim to restore liquidity  in problem debtors  with new
lending. They include  three  main sub-categories:
O  Pure  new lending  plans  that seek larger  volumes  of bilateral  and/or
multilateral  official lending or, as  in the  case of  the Baker
Initiative,  recommend a  combination  of  private and multilateral
lending.  Proposals  to increase  official  lending  unilaterally  often
emanate from governements  in capital exporting  countries.  Their
adoption  would require  legislative  action  for the appropriation  of
the  necessary  funds.
O  Credit-enhancement  plans that seek to generate  larger  lending  flows
by  promoting the  banks' collective interest in new  lending by
lowering  the  risk  on new  loans. This involves  third-party  guarantees
that could be provided  by  one of the multilateral  agencies, by
industrial  countries  or by a  new international  guarantee  agency.
Debt stabilization  plans that adopt a  more roundabout  aproach.
Starting  from  the  fact  that  a country's  ability  to service  debt is  as
much a function  of the predictability  of the cost  of external  debt
and of  the external environment--for  example, the occurence of
external  trade  shocks--as  of the level  of indebtedness  itself,  debt
stabilization  aims  to mitigate  the  impact  of  exogenous  events  on debt
servicing capacity.  Financial engineering techniques such as
interest-rate  swaps  and interest-rate  caps can be used to stabilize
debt costs.  This distinguishes  it from plans that focus on the
external  trading environment  and advocate  wider use of commodity
stabilization  techniques.  The  latter  are  not  reviewed  in this  paper.
Debt  reduction  and  debt  relief  plans
Debt relief  is explicitly  aimed  at countries  that  are overindebted,
and where additional  lending  would  make debt service  even more burdensome.
These  proposals  therefore  recommend  that,  in such  cases,  the countries'  debt
burden  be alleviated.  Under most formulations,  concessions  to the debtors
would require the appropriation  of public funds in industrial  countries.
Several proposals in  thsi  category also  involve complex institutional
arrangements,  such  as the  creation  of an international  debt  facility.
O  Proposals  to lower  the  cost  of debt aim  to bring  down  interest  rates
below risk-adjusted  market levels or  to forgive a  part of  the
interest  due, for instance  with extended  grace  periods  during  which
interest  payments  would be limited to a fixed proportion  of the
debtor's  export  revenues. In either  case the  contractual  amount  of
the principal due remains unchanged,  but lower interest  payments
reduce  the  discounted  present  value  of total  debt-service.- 17  -
o  Proposals  to lower tebt stocks  seek to adjust indebtedness  to the
debtors' estimated capacity to  pay.  Contrary to  VDR  that  is
negotiated  and depends on market opportunities  such as attractive
debt-equity swaps,  these  proposals advocate unrequited, often
involuntary,  debt forgiveness.  In most formulations  this would
involve the creation  of an International  Debt Facility  (IDF),  or
comparable  agency,  that  would  purchase  commercial  loans  at a  discount
that  is passed  through  to the  debtors.
Both types  of debt relief  face  an obvious  difficulty:  although  lower
debt service  may be necessary  for some countries,  concessions  should  not be
permamnent  or unconditional. Debt relief  by itself  cannot regenerate  the
necessary  investment  and the  growth  momemtum:  there  needs  to  be assurance  th&t
resources released  from  debt  service are  channelled into  productive
investment. In other  words,  countries  that seek  to obtain  debt relief  also
nee sound  economic  policies  to support  productive  investment.- 18  -
V. Technical  and  Operational  Aspects  of  Non-Market  Debt  Proposals
Besides  the  theoretical  distinction  between  mild and  severe  overhang,
which would serve to determine  potential  eligibility  to new money and debt
relief  plans  respectively,  the implementation  of most proposals  would  raise  a
number  of technical  and  operational  issues.
Criteria  for  the  applicability  of  new  money  plans
Raising  the level  of net lending  is the  most obvious  means to curb
the savings  drain in the debtor  countries. Depending  on the amount  of new
lending a  given plan could stimulate,  its  impact on  the magnitude and
direction  of net resource  transfers  could  be substantial. As a general  rule,
all  types  of new  money  plant,  whether  direct  or  by means  of  credit  enhancement
and debt  stabilization,  are more likely to create a  virtuous circle of
investment  and growth in countries with credible commitments  to reform,
prudent macro-economic  policies, and a  satisfactory  debt service record.
Applying  the same principles,  there  are no a priori  grounds  to extend  debt
relief  mechanisms,  beyond  VDR  and  reschedulings,  to those  countries.
New  lending
It is necessary  to make a clear  distinction  between  the effects  of
increased  official  and commercial  lending.  Commercial  loans  at market  terms
tend to be more expensive  and to have shorter  maturities  than those from
official  sources. By contrast,  long-term  official  bilateral  and  multilateral
lending can  be  tailored to  the  maturity profile of  a  country's debt
outstanding,  so as to ensure  a more even debt repayment  reschedule. Loans
from  multilateral  agencies  also  carry  strict  conditionality.  Their  structural
and sectoral  adjustment  loans (SALs  and SEALs)  in particular  are  designed  to
promote  adjustment  in the  debtor  countries.
Every  effort is,  therefore, justified to  maintain or  increase
official  lending  flows to the weaker  borrowers  with severe  debt overhangs,
provided  they  are current  in their  debt  service  to those  creditors  and  remain
committed  to necessary  adjustment. Official  lending  is also compatible  with
VDR  and  more formal  debt  relief  techniques.
Credit  enhancement
For any given stock od debt, the real cost and/or the amount of
principal  due  can fluctuate  as a result  of exogenous  factors. A conventional
method to calculate  a  country's  real borrowing  cost is to deflate  nominal
interest  rates  by the  country's  export-price  index.  i5t  Thus,  if that index
paper.  in
15/  This starts  from  the  premise  that  export  revenues  are  the  only  source  of- 19  -
drops, the real cost of debt rises.  Similarly,  the relative  size of debt
stocks comprised of various curreticies  is affected by valuation effects
associated 67ith  the  variability  of  cross-exchange rates  of  those
currencies._  Illiquidity  occurs when actual debt-service  payments due
temporarily  exceed  a debtor's  debt-servicing  capability.
Guarantees  of debt-service  obligations  by creditworthy  third  parties
remove  the  uncertainties  posed  to  lenders  by  a debtor's  potential  illiquidity,
but do not address the external  factors that could cause it.  Aside from
eligibility  criteria--as  stated  earlier,  guarantees  that  encourage  new lending
are not advisable  for  insolvent  countries--a  number  of considerations  dictate
that  credit enhancement follows strict pricing rules and  not  be  used
indiscriminately.
0  Given that risk-adjusted  spreads  on guaranteed  loans  are lower  than
those that apply to  the (unguaranteed)  borrower,  guarantee fees
should  be priced  correctly. This  means that that  the  total  cost of
funds--including fees--does  not  exceed  that  or  unguaranteed
borrowings. Pricing  should  also  be commensurate  with  the  guarantor's
risk on the loans,  rather  than be undifferentiated,  so as to avoid
"onegative  selection"  whereby  only  the  least  creditworthy  debtors  seek
coverage.
o  There should be a  degree of burden sharing between lenders and
guarantors,  to limit the latters'  risk and preserve  the lenders'
involvement  in the debtor  countries.  It can be achieved through
partial  coverage,  for instance  on principal  only.  Creditors  would
still  carry the risk of non payment  of interest,  but the risk-free
principal  would be protected  against  further  writeoffs  in the  event
of non-payment. Partial  coverage  also ensures  maximum  leverage  of
scarce  guarantees.
O  Guarantees  should  be used  selectively  to  enhance  access  to voluntary,
rather  than concerted  lending. This  makes it preferable  to reserve
them to borrowers that have moved beyond the debt restructuring
phase.
0  As a rule,  guarantees  are preferable  to collateral  security  in the
form of asset pledges.  Given the prevalence  of negative  pledge
clauses  in most loan agreements,  asset  pledges  can be cumbersome  as
they  would  require  waivers  from  all  existing  unprotected
foreign  exchange  to service  external  debt. An alternative  method  to
compute  real  costs  is to  use  an import-price  deflator,  on the  assumption
that  monies  borrowed  are  used  to finance  imports.
16/  In 1987  the  total  long-term  debt  of the  developing  countries  increased  by
$102.5  billion  in  nominal  terms. However,  of that  amount  $74.5  billion
(or  73  percent  of the  total)  was  directly  attributable  to  currency
valuation  effects,  associated  with  the  strong  depreciation  of the  US- 20 -
creditors. 171  In addition, collateral may have to be purchased by
debtors and  use  up  precious foreign exchange resrves.  This
discriminates  against  debtors  that  have insufficient  reserves.
Debt stabilization
An  alternative to  protecting creditors against  the  potential
interruption  of debt  service  is to  safeguard  the  debtors  against  the  impact  of
future volatility in  the  external environment  on  their debt  servicing
obligations. From the creditors'  point  of view this type of protection  is
indirect:  although  a more predictable  debt profile  is likely to improve  a
debtor's  ability  to service  debt,  it  cannot  ensure  willingness  to do so.  Debt
stabilization  techniques  could  therefore  be less  effective  than  guarantees  as
a  catalyst  for resumed  voluntary  commercial  lending. On the  other  hand,  the
protection  these techniques  offer  may be welcome for borrowers  as it would
dilute  the  effects  of exogenous  shocks  on  adjustment.
Protection  against changes in the external  environment  falls into
three  categories:
lowering  the  interest-rate  sensitivity  of  debt  outstanding;
limiting  the  impact  of currency  valuation  effects  on debt  stocks,  and
ensuring  greater  consistency  between  the  currency  mix of  debt service
and  that  of foreign  trade  earnings;
stabilizing  export commodity prices to limit the variability  of
export  receipts  and  of the  export-adjusted  real  cost  of  debt.
a.  Limiting  the  interest-rate  sensitivity  of debt
By far the largest  part of the  HICs'  commercial  debt is  at floating
rates.  Three- and six-month  dollar  LIBOR is the most widely  used pricing
benchmark.  Unforeseeable  shifts in the level of that benchmark--from  an
average  of about 11 in 1979,  to more than 19 percent  in 1980--set  the stage
for the 1982  debt crisis.  It follows  that,  if the  debtors  can be protected
against  interest-rate  shocks,  the  future  value  of the  total  debt service  would
be more  predictable  and  sustainable.  This,  in  turn,  may be  a catalyst  for  new
lending.
dollar  during  the same  year.
17/  Negative  pledges  specify  that  all  creditors  shall  be treated  equally.
Therefore,  if  existing  creditors  are  uncollaterlized,  there  is  a pledge
not to  offer  collateral  to  other  creditors,  unless  prior  creditors  are
treated  equally  (pari  passu). For  example,  in  the  case  of Mexico's
collateralized  debt  buyback  of 1988,  non-participating  creditors,
including  the  World  Bank,  had  to waive  the  pari  passu  clause. By
contrast,  in  a pure,  uncollateralized  guarantee,  a third  party  assumes--
for  a fee--the  commercial  risk  of nonpayment  by the  primary  obligor.  this- 21 -
Aside  from  borrowing  at fixed  rates--a  market  segment  that  is seldom
open  to developing countries--the  most  effective protection  against the
variablity  of  nominal  interest  rates  is  to use  risk  transformation  and  hedging
techniques  that  lower  the interest-rate  sensitivity  of debt.
Risk transformation  involves  interest-rate  swaps  that  can  be used to
transform  floating-rate  liabilities  into fixed-rate  debt.  Such swaps are
actively  traded  in financial  markets. An interest-rate  swap  agreement  commits
two  parties  to  exchanging  responsibility  for  all interest  payments  on specific
liabilities. Thus,  to obtain  the desired  protection,  a debtor  country  would
have  to service  a counterparty's  fixed-rate  debt,  in  exchange  for  that  party's
commitment to service the country's floating-rate  debt of equal amount,
maturity  and currency.
As there  is  no exchange  of principal  amounts,  the  only  risk  for  each
party to the swap agreement  is that the other party  could default on its
interest  payments.  That risk varies  over time,  depending  on interest-rate
movements. For example,  the risk to the  floating-rate  payer  (in  this  case  a
developing  country's  partner  in the  swap)  increases  whenever  short-term  rates
fall.  Lesser-rated parties, including most  developing countries, are
therefore normally required to provide performance  guarantees  by a  more
creditworthy  third  party.
One indirect  benefit  is  that  performance  guarantees  reduce  the  swap's
implicit  cost (the  difference  in the internal  rate  of return  of the  floating-
rate  and fixed-rate  cash  flows  that  are being  exchanged). This  suggests  that
the  pricing  and selectivity  criteria  that  were  set  out for  credit  enhancement
should  also  apply  to these  more limited  swap  performance  guarantees.
Interest-rate  caps that set a ceiling  on interest-rate  levels  are
alternative  forms of  protection.  Like  swaps, rate caps are  traded in
financial  markets. Their  purchase  involves  lump-sum  payments  to the provider
of the cap, equal  to the  discounted  value  of t  l,risk that  market  rates  will
exceed  the cap over the life of the  agreement.  %'  This is a clear  drawback
for developing  countries  with limited  foreign  exchange  resources. However,
the  cost of caps can  be lowered  if  a debtor  is tilling  to accept  more limited
protection. A possible  structure  is to capitalize  interest  in excess  of a
given  ceiling. As is  described  in  the  next secti:.i,  this  more  complex  formula
would  require  the  intervention  of a central  cleariAg  agency.
Finally,  as an alternative  to interest  swaps  and caps, debtors  can
hedge interest-rate  risks with options  and futures.  Both instruments  are
described  below in the context  of currency  hedging,  which follows  the basic
principles  of interest-rate  hedging.
requires  no  waiver  from  existing,  inguaranteed  creditors.
18/  This  explains  why the  pricing  of caps  is  a function  of the  period  over
which  they  run  and  of expected  interest-rate  trends. The  greater  the
probability  expected  probability  that  interest  rates  will rise,  the  higher- 22 -
b.  Limiting  the  debtors'  foreign-exchange  risks  and  exposure
Risk of  loss or  of  opportunities  foregone is  inherent in  any
financial  decision,  including  that  of borrowing  in one currency  rather  than
another. The  choice  of loan  currencies  is  seldom  left  to  borrowers. Although
the US dollar  is the most common  vehicle  for syndicated  lending,  in recent
years non-US commercial  banks and export  credit  agencies  have increasingly
chosen  to lend in their  own currencies. This can  create  a currency  risk  for
debtors  whose foreign  trade earnings  are predominantly  in US dollars.  In
addition,  as  mentioned  earlier,  in  periods  of dollar  weakness,  non-dollar  debt
inflates  the  dollar  value  of debt  stocks  and  debt  service.
Both risks--valuation  effects  and currency  mismatches  with foreign
trade  revenue--can  be hedged.  In its  simplest  form  a currency  hedge  offers
protection  against potential  losses  due to exchange-rate  fluctuations.  For
instance,  if a foreign  currency  is to be received  in the  future  as settlement
of a sale of goods and services,  that currency  can be sold in the forward
market before it is actually received.  A  forward sale at today's price
protects,  or "covers",  the creditor  against  the risk of devaluation  of a
currency  that may be needed  later  for  debt service. But the trade-off  of a
forward sale is that any gain on the potential  appreciation  of the same
currency  is  automatically  foregone.
In  the rapidly changing international  financial  markets currency
options  and futures  are now u  Id  and offer  more flexible  hedges  of foreign-
exchange  risks and exposures.  Futures markets are distinct from cash
markets. In the  latter  any  transaction  is settled  in  full,  at the  time  of the
transaction. By contrast,  contract  sizes  and settlement  dates  for financial
futures  are standardized,  they are traded in specialized  markets  and only
small margin deposits  are required  prior to settlement.  This means that
relatively  small  cash  investments  can  be highly  leveraged.
the  cost  of the  cap.
19/  The  theory  of options  and futures  is  extremely  complex. Both  techniques
are  designed  to  minimize  downside  risks  without  foregoing  opportunities  of
future  gain.  This  explains  why  a "good"  hedge--there  are  no perfect
hedges--has  to share  the  financial  characteristics  of the  asset  it
protects,  have  a predictable  price  pattern  that  is the  reciprocal  to that
of the  primary  asset  (or  liability)  and  involve  a minimal  cash  investment.
Taking  the  example  of  hedging  currency  risks  on  debt  with options  or
futures,  the  cash  transaction  (the  borrowing  in  a currency  such  as yen  the
debtor  does  not  wish to  hold)  can  be hedged  by the  purchAse  of  an option
or future  on that  currency. Any future  loss  arising  from  an appreciation
of that  currency  (debt  service  in  aprreciated  yens.  while  export  receipts
are  in  dollars)  will  be partly  compensated  by the  ability  to take  delivery
of that  currency  at a price  agreed  before  its  appreciation.
Both  tools  can  also  be used  to  hedge  the  disposal  of a cash  asset  (such  as
a country's  secondary  reserves)  to  generate  liquid  funds. If the  price  of
that  asset  (for  example,  US  Treasury  bonds)  is  expected  to  rise  after  its
sale,  an option  or future  on the  same  asset  can  be bought  to  capture  that- 23 -
Financial options  are  distinct  from  futures,  but  have  many
similarities  with them.  An option is a contract  between  two parties--the
seller,  or 'writer'  of the option,  and the buyer--that  gives the right,  but
not the obligation,  to either  to sell (put  options)  or buy (call  options)  a
specific financial  asset sucV  l  given amount of foreign currency  or an
interest-bearing  instrument.  That asset, which is seldom delivered,
serves  to  hedge  a cash  asset. The similarity  with futures  markets  is  that  the
purchase  of options  also  involves  relatively  small  margin  deposits.
Given  their  complexity,  these  financial  tools  are  usually  impractical
for all  but  a  handful of  countries with  sophisticated  debt management
strategies. Options,  in particular,  are speculative  and carry  a substantial
risk  of financial  loss.  By contrast,  currency  swaps  are  more practical--and
less  risky--hedging  tools.  Their structure  is quite  simple  and involves  the
spot sale of the currency  the borrower  wishes  to relinquish  and a matching
long-term  forward  repurchase  of the same currency.  When swaps  are used to
hedge  the currency  risk on a borrowing,  their  maturity  (i.e.  the  date of the
long forward  repurchase)  can  be timed  to coincide  with  that of the borrowing
itself, so  that  the  original currency is  available for  the  principal
repayment.  Like interest-rate  swaps, currency  swaps entail a performance
risk.  Moreover,  as the latter  swaps  involve  an exchange  of principal,  the
counterparty'  s risk,  hence the desired  performance  guarantee,  is larger  and
more  costly. This  is  likely  to restrict  the  use  of  currency  swaps  to the  more
creditworthy  developng  countries.
Debt  relief  and  debt  reduction
Advocates  of broad  based  debt relief  argue  that  where commitment  to
adjustment and  reform is  patchy and  compounded  by  actual or  de  facto
insolvency,  debt accretion  is most likely  to refinance  maturing  obligations
and usually  translates  into higher,  even less sustainable  debt ratios,  that
exacerbate  insolvency. Thus,  for  countries  in this  category,  new lending  may
prove  counterproductive  unless  it follows  the  general  criteria  and  conditions
used  by  multilateral  agencies.
The rationale  for debt relief  is that  a severe  debt overhang  is an
obstacle to--and often a  disincentive  for--successful  adjustment.  This
suggests that  in  countries with  strong debt  overhangs and  uncertain
commitments  to adjustment,  debt relief  with appropriate  conditionality  and
surveillance  would  ensure  that necessary  reforms  are introduced  and that the
savings generated by  lower debt service are  channelled into productive
investments.  This  would  enable  them  to  expand  production  and  resume  growth  at
a  lower level of indebtedness.  Once sufficient  growth is achieved,  debt
ratios  would  fall  further  still,  which  would  subsequently  pave  the  way for  the
potential  gain.
20/  Commodity  and  stock  options  and futures  follow  the  same  general- 24 -
more  conventional  pattern of  new  borrowings, after creditworthiness  is
improved.  The more comprehensive  debt proposals  that aim to combine  debt
reduction  with  new  lending  adhere  to  the  same  principles.
As was argued  in the 1988-89  edition  of the  World  Debt Tables,  the
main advantage  of a  properly structured  debt relief  _21,an  is that it can
provide  a solution  to free  riding  by smaller  creditors.  ZlI  For  example,  some
proposals  include  a combination  of incentives  to participate  and  deterrents  to
minimize  free riding  (non participation):  the so-called  "carrots  and sticks"
approach. Carrots  can include  more favorable  risk  weighting  of the  remaining
loans--after  debt reduction--to  the same debtors,  on the presumption  that
lower  debt stocks  will increase  the co'lytries'  ability  to service  them,  and
thus  improve  the  quality  of those  loans.'  Ar.  alternative  is  to enable  banks
to spread  the amortization  of write-offs  over time, so as to reduce the
immediate  impact  on their  capital  and  maximize  tax  benefits. One of the  most
standard  sticks  to  deter  free  riders  is  the  obligation  for  non-participants  to
mark  down  their loan assets to  the  level of  discounts agreed by  the
participating  creditors  and to absorb  that  financial  loss in the  first  year.
The introduction  of such sanctions  would require the cooperation  of bank
regulators.
The advantage  of offering  a potential  solution  to free riding  could
nevertheless be  offset  by  other  legal,  operational and  financial
considerations  that  are basic  obstacles  to the implementation  of debt relief
proposals.
0  Debt forgiveness  is exposed  to moral  hazard  by the  debtors. If,  as
is suggested  in many proposals,  an IDF  were to purchase  the  banks'
claims  at discounts  that are a function  of prices  in the secondary
loan  market,  the  debtors'  gains  would  be commensurate  to the  depth  of
the discount.  This could  create  an incentive  to manipulate  market
conditions  with  threats  to suspend  debt service. As discounts  in the
secondary  loan  market  deepen  in response  to such  threats,  the  debtors
would benefit  from any subsequent  debt repurchase  at lower  prices.
Potential moral hazard can be minimized by delinking the IDF's
purchase price  from  market  discounts and  by  imposi  n  strict
conditionality  as  an eligibility  criterion  for  debt  relief.__/
principles,  but  are  not  relevant  in  this  context.
21/  Free  riding  is  generally  difficult  to  avoid  in  market-based  menu  options
and  debt  reschedulings,  given  that  national  legal  systems  protect  banks
against  coercion. However,  in  September  1988  a provisional  agreement  to
reschedule  debt  for  C6te  d'Ivoire  attempted  to  deal  with  this  problem.
The  agreement,  which  is  not  yet  effective,  would  ensure  that  free  riders
do not  receive  interest  payments  from  new resources  made  available  by the
participating  banks.
22/  Under  the  Basle  Committee  guidelines  loans  to  non-OECD  countries  will  be
weighted  at 100  percent  of face  value.- 25 -
0  A further complication  is that commercial  creditors  could benefit
financially  from the introduction  of a debt relief  plan.  This has
led some to argue that such schemes  would  amount  to a bank bailout.
For example,  several  recent  studies  have shown  that  the launching  of
a major debt initiative  would raise secondary-market  prices  on the
assumption that  relief would  improve the  probability that  the
remaining  debt  will  be serviced. If,  as may be required  to  minimize
moral  hazard  by the  debtors,  the  IDF  were to  repurchase  debt  at those
higher  market  prices,  the  banks  could  benefit  in three  ways:  lower
discounts  on loan sales  would contain  book losses;  the quality  and
market price of their remaining  lo.  n assets  would improve;  credit
risk of a part of their  portfolio  would  be transferred  to the IDF.
Such  gains could  be lowered  by relatinf4the  IDF's  purchase  price  to
the  original,  pre-IDF  market  discounts.' 4'
O  A related  consideration  is that if debt relief  were provided  by a
publicly-funded  internlational  debt  agency  that  repurchases  commercial
loans,  a large  number  of private  creditors  would  be able to transfer
risk  assets  to a single  public  sector  agency. Once ownership  of the
loans  had been transferred  to the  IDF--in  exchange  for its  own  debt
securities--it  would  bear  the  full risk  of  nonpayment by  the
debtors.  That socialization  of risks  would run counter  to market
practice  and  may  be difficult  to justify.
O  By contrast,  if commercial  banks were virtually  forced to sell a
substantial  portion  of their  claims  on developing  countries  at large
discounts,  their  book  losses  could  exceed  those  that  have so  far  been
associated  with VDR.  For the less provisioned  banks such losses
could  exceed  existing  provisions  and,  in extreme  cases,  substantially
erode  regulatory  capital. The banks  could  also argue  that official.
creditors  should  sihare  these losses.  The HICs owe more than $127
billion  to official  creditors,  including  $66 billion  in liabilities
to, or guaranteed  by industrial  country governments.  Commercial
banks would naturally  be  loath to accept unilateral  losses that
improve  the  value  of official  claims  on the  same  creditors.
O  Last,  but  not least,  the  creation  of a new international  debt  agency
would almost certainly  involve  substantial  financial  costs for the
governments in  industrial countries that  fund  the  agency and
underwrite  its  commitments.  The  initial  capitalization  would  require
large injections  of public funds.  Moreover,  the agency  would be
exposed to the risk of nonpayment  of lcans it had acquired from
commercial  creditors.  Commitment to underwrite  these potential
losses  would  require  additional  budgetary  allocations.
231  Corden,  W. Max,  An International  Debt  Facility?,  IMF  Working  Paper,
2/12/88,  p. 11.- 26 -
This  last point is crucial, as  it may  be  impossible  to  reach
political  consensus  on these  budgetary  implications  in the  present  environment
of  resource  constraints and  fiscal  austerity  in  several  industrial
countries.  However, one  could argue that the  unconditional  commercial
recycling  of OPEC's surpW es to developing  countries  during  the 1970s  had
been  actively  encouraged.  _  . By stimulating  import-led  growth  in the  debtor
countries  that recycling  generated  exports to developing  countries,  which
dampened the recessionnary  impact of  the first oil  shock in  industrial
countries. In that sense,  any use of public  monies  to alleviate  severe  debt
overhangs  would  be the  deferred  cost  of those  past -conomic  benefits.
The implementation  of debt relief  schemes  would  also raise  a number
of operational  issues.
O  How  much debt  relief  should  be provided? A possible  criterion  is  to
set debt relief  at a level  that would bring  the debt-service  ratio
(or interest  ratio)  within  the "saf_ty  range".  However,  that  range
can be subjective  and varies  from country  to country:  at a given
debt-service  ratio,  say  25 percent,  certain  countries  may  experience
problems,  others  not.  In other  words,  capacity  to pay can only be
determined  on a case-by-case  basis.  An alternative,  as proposed  by
UNCTAD  in 1988 (see  below)  is to grant  across-the-board  debt  relief
in a certain  amount  (in UNCTAD's  proposal,  30 percent  of the  HICs'
commercial  debt).  The disadvantages  of the  latter  approach  are  that
it fails to differentiate  among borrowers  and that the writeoffs
commercial  banks would have to make could exceed the level of
provisioning  of the  less  protected  banks.
o  What  would  be  the  institutional relationship between a  new
international  debt facility  and the existing  multilateral  agencies?
For example, the IDF could be set up as a  separate  entity that
cooperates with  the  multilaterals  to  determine eligibility of
individual  countries  and the  amount  of relief  to be granted  to  each.
It would also have to liaise  with the multilaterals  to establish
appropriate conditionality  and  surveillance procedures for  the
countries that had  received debt relief.  Alternatively,  as  is
recommended  by a number  of proposals,  the IDF  could  be set  up as a
joint subsidiary  of  the  IBRD and  IMF  to minimize coordination
problems.
O  Should  relief  take the form of interest  concessions  or partial  debt
reduction?  Two  reasons argue in favor of  choosing the  former
method.  First,  the extended  grace periods  of recent  reschedulings
would initially  limit the cash-flow  effect of debt reduction  to
interest  savings  on the principal  forgiven,  but would have little
24/  Ibid.
25/  Lever  & Huhme, Debt  and  Danger,  The  World  Financial  Crisis,  Penguin  Books- 27 -
impact on  principal repayments that had  been  deferred by  the
rescheduling.  To grant  debt  reduction  under  such  circumstances  would
create an asymmetry between the debtors' limited gains and  the
creditors'  substantial  book losses.  Secondly,  in medium-  and long-
term  loans  at  market  rates,  interest  payments  usually  account  for  the
larger  part of the total  cash flow of debt service. Thus interest
rate  concessions  would  generate  greater  savings  for  the debtors. Of
course, as  is  recommended in  several proposals, interest and
principal  reductions  can  be combined.- 28  -
VI.  The  Major  Debt  Proposals
This section provides summaries of the most representative  debt
proposals.  The Baker Initiative,  one of the best known and most discussed
debt plans,  is not reviewed  here,  nor are proposals  for  debt relief  to low-
income  Sub-Saharan  countries. For proposals  with multiple  features  the  most
salient  aspect  (e.g.  debt forgiveness  in plans  that combine  concessions  with
new  lending)  is used  for  ranking.
Increased  lending  by official  and  commercial  sources
Most new money  proposals  share  the concerns  of the Baker  Initiative
but set higher targets for new lending  and, in some cases,  recommend  the
creation of a  new  international  agency as coordinator  of conditionality.
Their usual weakness  is the absence of safeguards  against  free riding,  as
participation  is  deemed  voluntary.
The  de Carmoy  proposal  (1987)  26/
This  recent  proposal  envisages  that  the  governments  of the  USA,  Japan
and European  countries  would  assume  joint  responsibility  for increased  lending
to the  original Baker 15 plus Poland and Romania.  The plan would be
implemented  in stages: during  an initial  trial  phase  only  three  countries--
two Latin American and one other HIC--would  be used to test the plan's
effectiveness.
After it is extended  to the seventeen  target  countries,  this plan
would aim to raise new lending  by at least $30 billion  per year, for ten
years.  Of that total,  the  multilateral  banks  would  provide  $5-8  billion  per
year for  project  loans,  and industrial  countries  $15 billion  at concessional
rates.  Commercial  banks would provide the balance for project or trade
financing. During  each  of the  first  three  years  of full  operation,  $3 billion
would be set aside in a Compensatory  Financing  Facility  to protect  debtors
against  unforeseen  increases  in  real  interest  rates.
de Carmoy's  three  explicit  aims  are to:  raise  real  GNP  growth  in the
target  coutries  to 6  to 7 percent;  provide sufficient  time for structural
adjustment;  generate  "credibility"  for the plan in the largest  HICs.  It
stresses  the  need  for  a the  case-by-case  approach.
A  central feature of de Carmoy's  proposal  is the creation  of an
Action Committee comprised of respresentatives  of  the private  and public
sectors  of the sponsor  governments.  The Committee  would administer  total
Ltd.,  Harmondsworth,  England,  1987;  pp 55-57.
26/  ##?de  Carmoy,  Herve,  "Debt  and  Growth  in  Latin  America:  A European
Banker's  Proposal;  Working  Paper  9, Instituto  ##?de  Relaciones  Eurpeo-- 29  -
lending, coordinate the  commercial banks'  share of  total  lending and
coordinate  agreement on  the  required conditionality  between lenders and
borrowers.  The  Committee's  staff would be  limited, as  it  would draw
extensively  on  the World Bank's and  IMF's design of  conditionality  and
adjustment  programs. Finally,  the committee  would "self  destruct"  after  the
ten-year  implementation  period  of the  increased  lending  is  concluded.
Superseding  its  coordinating  role,  the  Committee-s  main purpose  would
be to add  "political  momentum  and  weight  to the  process"  ___  In other  words,
it would  create  moral suasion  for  the banks  to increase  lending,  and for  the
debtors  to adhere  to the  conditionality. Beyond  that  organizational  aspect,
the de Carmoy proposal is essentially  an  expanded  version of the Baker
Initiative.
The  plan's  self-avowed weaknesses are  its  cost  to  industrial
countries  (an  estimated  0.3 percent  of the  combined  GNP of the  USA,  Japan  and
the EC in each of  the plan's ten years, to cover their share of total
lending),  and the lack of political  consensus.  To this one could add the
cumbersome  structure  of the Action  Committee,  the lack of sanctions  against
free  riding,  and  focus  on a single  remedy:  more  debt.
Japan's  recycling  plan  28/
In 1987  the  Japanese  government  pledged  to recycle  up to $30  billion
equivalent  of its  current-account  surplus  in  favor  of developing  countriies  in
two tranches  of respectively  $10 and $20 million  equivalent,  the latter  of
which  will be spread  over three  years,  ending  in 1990.  This  amount  includes
both public and private funds that will be deployed in the form of (i)
supplementary  budgetary  allocations  for  credits  to the  IMF  and IDA  8; (ii)  the
establishment  of the Asian  Development  fund,  to be administered  by the  Asian
Development  Bank;  (iii)  loans  by Japanese  commercial  banks  to  the  Multilateral
Development Banks  including the  World  Bank,  (iv) expansion of  untied
cofinancing  with  international  development  institutions  by  the country's
Overseas  Economic  Cooperation  Fund,  the  Export-Import  Bank  of Japan  (EXIM)  and
Japanese  commercial  banks;  and (v) expansion  of direct  loans to developing
countries  through  untied  EXIM  loans.
The  Japanese  initiative  includes  the  creation  of  a Japan  Special  Fund
in the World Bank.  This fund is comprised  of grants  of Yen 30 billion  for
"untied"  cofinancing  by Japanese  commercial  banks  of World  Bank projects  and
programs. It also provides  for expanded  access  for  World  Bank  borrowings  in
the  Japanese  capital  market,  in an amount  of Yen 300  billion  (a  total  of over
$2  billion),  to be spread  over  three  years.
Latino  Americanas,  Madrid,  1987.
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As part of that recycling,  Japan  also intends  to accelerate  by two
years its  plan to  double its  official development  assistance (ODA) to
developing  countries  and to have ODA disbursements  of more than  $7.6 billion
in 1990.  In 1986,  the Japan's  ODA already  rose to $5.6 billion,  so that it
has replaced  France  as the second  largest  provider  of ODA, after the  United
States.  Japan has  traditionally  extended  much of its aid to developing
countries in Asia, but  in recent years, it has increased  its grants to
Sub-Saharan  African  countries.
This plan is already  operating  : Yen 6 billion  that  are part  of the
first  tranche  were deposited  with the  World  Bank in 1987. The  main criterion
of success  will be that  the recycled  funds  are used for  productive  means  by
the recipient  countries.  Recipient  governments  and financing  agencies  will
therefore  need to ensure  effective  evaluation  and monitoring  of projects  and
programs  financed  by these funds  However,  the plan's  size should  not be
overestimated,  at it includes  funds that would have been allocated  in any
event  (for  example  Japan's  contribution  to IDA-8). In addition,  a large  part
of  the  "recycling" will  involve private  funds,  including commercial
cofinancing  and  enlarged  cecess  for  World  Bank  borrowings  in  the  Tokyo  market.
New commercial  leading  supported  by credit  enhancement
The  Lever  plan  (1983)  291
The original  formulation  of this plan  by Lord Lever  and Christopher
Huhne  dates  back  to 1983  and  has  been  revised  since  then.  Its  central  feature
is partial  risk coverage,  comparable  to that  offered  by the  export  guarantee
schemes  of industrial  countries. The beneficiaries  (creditors)  would  have to
pay variable  premia  that reflect  the underlying  risk,  and part of the risk
would  remain  uncovered. The  main difference  from  existing  practices  is that
coverage  would be subject  to periodic  ceilings,  to be set by the IMF on a
case-by-case  basis in light  of each debtor's  projected  negative  cash flow.
New loans covered  under that ceiling  would be subject  to strict  condition-
ality,  agreed  between  the IMF and the borrower,  aimed  at stimulating  growth
and investment. The policies  to be adoptli,as  part of the conditionality,
while  necessarily  "sound,  even  austere"  _,  would  stress  positive  net
transfers. They  would  also  aim to relieve  the  foreign-exchange  constraint  on
the  debtors'  growth.
The  ceiling  for  new lending--originally  estimated  by the  authors  in  a
range of $30 to 40 billion--could  be adjusted in light of international
developments:  it could be  increased  after a  new external shock to allow
greater  time for adjustment  in debtor  countries,  or be reduced  in periods  of
rising  inflation. The guarantees  would  also  aim to achieve  the  finest  market
28/  World  Development  Report  1988,  Box 1.3,  p. 21.
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rates for new loans and would be administered  by national  export credit
agencies  within  guidelines  and ceilings  set by the IMF.  Consistent  with the
practice  of export credit guarantees,  the new loans  would be provided  by
commercial  banks,  but the  ultimate  liability  for  defaults  on guaranteed  loans
would  fall  upon the  industrial  countries,  through  the  IMF.
Obviously,  the  borrowers  could  only benefit  from this scheme  if the
guarantee  premia  are lower than the cost savings  on risk-adjusted  lending
rates. But  this plan  offers  the  benefit  of simplicity--there  would  be no new
institution. It would also offer safeguards  against  free riding  by forcing
nonparticipants  to  write down non-performing  loans and, through partial
guarantee coverage,  ensure burden sharing between official  guaramtors  and
private  banks.  However,  it shares  the weakness  of the  de Carmoy  proposal  by
advocating  increased  lending,  even to countries  with severe  debt overhangs.
This may well reflect  the plan's  age: in 1983 the consensus  was that HICs
suffered  from  illiquidity  that  could  be resolved  by increased  lending  flows.
The  Rotberg  plan (1988)  31/
This plan emanates  from the World Bank's former treasurer.  Like
Lever,  Rotberg  recommends  partial  guarantees. In  this  case  only  the  principal
amount  of loans  would  be covered,  so that  commercial  creditors  would  not  need
to write down their book value in the case of default.  Coverage  would  be
provided  by  means  of complex  financial  engineering  techniques.
Under the Rotberg  plan, new commercial  lending  would be long-term,  with
maturities  of up to 20 years.  Those loans  would run in parallel  with World
Bank  structural  adjustment  loans  (SALs),  and  have  substantial  balloons  at the
final  maturity. The  World  Bank  would  guarantee  the  principal  amount  of those
loans  by offering  a "put"--that  is,  a commitment  to purchase.  The  put  would  be
at par, cover all principal repayments,  and only be exercizable  after 20
years. (This  explains  the  proposed  maturities  for  new loans,  and  the  need for
balloon  repayments.)
Lenders  who exercize  the put--i.e.,  who use the Bank's  guarantee--
would  automatically  be obliged  to relend  the same  amount  to a new  World  Bank
affiliate  for another  20 years.  Those  new loans  would  be at v4riable  rates
corresponding  to  the  yield  of 3-month  US Treasury  bills. The  Bank's  affiliate
would  use  the  proceeds  of that  loan  to  purchase  the  original  credits.
Rotberg's  approach  offers  the  advantage  of  burden  sharing: in  return
for improved  protection,  the lenders  too would  have to be prepared  to make
certain  sacrifices:  an  original  commitment  of up to 20, plus  the  obligation
to onlend  for a further  20 years if the guarantee  is exercized;  low yields
during  the latter  20 years.  A further  advantage  is that,  except  for the
capitalization  of the World Bank's  new affiliate,  the plan  would  be largely
self-financing:  the  affilate's  repurchase  of risk assets  would  be financed  by
the  original  lenders,  at the  finest  available  market  rates.
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However,  Rotberg's  plan  also  has  certain  weaknesses.  It  is
organizationally  complex,  notably  in  requiring  the  creation  of  a  new  World
Bank  affiliate.  It  involves  complex  financial  engineering.  Only  new  lending
in  US dollars  would  be  eligible  for  the  Bank's  puts,  which  would  exclude  non-
US creditors  th,  t  elect  to  lend  in  their  own  currencies.  The  dollar  emphasis
may  also  be  sub-optimal  if  it  increases  the  dollar  exposure  of  countries  whose
export  earnings  have  a  large  non-dollar  component.  Finally,  there  are  no
"sticks"  to  deter  free  riders.
Among other  credit  enhancement  proposals  is  that  of  First  Interstate
Bank  321.  This  plan  incorporates  some  of  the  features  of  Mexico's  securitized
debt  defeasance  scheme  of  1987:  a  condition  of  new  loans  by  commercial  banks
would  be  that  part  of  the  loan  proceeds  be  set  aside  by  the  borrowers  to
purchase  US Government  zero-coupon  bonds  that  would  serve  as  collateral.
Interest  stabilization
The  principles  and  techniques  of  interest-rate  stabilization  were  set
out  in  the  previous  section.  One  variant  to  protect  debtor  countries  against
future  increases  of  the  nominal  cost  of  debt  is  to  use  the  principles  applied
in  adjustable-rate  mortgages,  so  that  a  ratchet  would  limit  interest-rate
increments  from  one  interest  payment  date  to  another.  This  is  based  on  the
assumption  that  most  debtors  can  accommodate  small  variations  in  nominal--and
real--costs,  but  are  destabilized  by  extreme  fluctuations  of  interest  rates,
such  as  those  that  occurred  at  the  start  of  this  decade.
Implementation  of  that  type  of  protection  would  require  an
institutional  framework,  for  instance  an  Interest  Stabilization  Facility
(ISF),  sponsored  and  funded  by  industrial  countries.  The  ISF  that  would  bear
similarit3,  with  Interest  Compensation  Facility  of  the  now  defunct  Herrhausen
proposal  and  with  de  Carmoy's  Compensatory  Financing  Facility.
Its  role  would  be  to  determine  the  appropriate  ceiling  for  a  "moving
interest-rate  cap"  in  any  given  period.  Maximum increments  would  be  defined
in  light  of  anticipated  interest-rate  trends,  and  of  the  capacity  by  eligible
debtors  to  absorb  certain  rate  increments.  The  ISF  would  also  be  a  central
clearing  house  between  lenders  and  debtors.  Whenever  market  rates  exceed  the
cap,  the  ISF  would  pay  that  excess  to  commercial  creditors  on  the  debtors'
behalf,  and  capitalize  it  as  a  direct  claim  on  the  debtors.  To  amortize  that
claim,  debtors  would  continue  to  pay  the  ISF  the  capped  rate  when  interest  due
on  the  original  floating-rate  loan  falls  below  the  cap.  Depending  on  whether
any  residual  claim  oustanding  is  extinguished  at  the  maturity  of  the  cap,  debt
stabilization  of  this  kind  could  involve  a  concessional  element,  akin  to
interest-rate  relief.
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The ISF's commitments  could be underwritten  by a pool of central
banks.  In practice  those commitments  and risk exposure  are likely  to be
limited,  even if interest  rates rise over long periods of time.  Extreme
turbulence  of  interest  rates, rather than steady increses,  occurs seldom.
Moroever,  the ISF could set caps at levels  that  minimize  its  exposure. The
main  drawback of  this  approach  is  its  operational and  institutional
complexity.
Debt  relief  through  interest-rate  reductions
Interest  forgiveness  is legally distinct from risk transformation
through  swaps  and from  the  protection  offered  by a potential  ISF. In both  of
the latter cases original contrattual  obligations  towards lenders remain
unchanged:  although  the cost of these  obligations  is cushioned  by a market
(swap)  or institutional  (ISF)  mechanism,  the lenders  would  not have  to incur
any  losses. By  contrast,  interest  forgiveness  would  translate  into  lower  cash
flows  and  loss  of  revenue  for  all creditors  that  grant  it,  unless  their  income
loss  is  absorbed  by a publicly-financed  institution.
The  Rohatyn  proposal (1983)  34/
This  plan combines concessional  interest relief, long-term debt
rescheduling  and  debt service  payments  that  are  adjusted  as a function  of the
debtors'  export  revenues. It  draws  on Rohatyn's  earlier  success  in  resolving
New York City's  fiscal  crisis  with the creation  of the  Municipal  Assistance
Corporation  (MAC).  Based  on that precedent,  Rohatyn  recommends  the creation
of a "developing-country  MAC" that would reschedule  commercial  and official
bilateral  debt, and stretch  out short-term  debt to maturities  of 25 to 30
years.  The "DCMAC"  would facilitate  the rescheduling  by offering  its own
long-term  bonds in exchange  for developing  country  debt.  In other  words,
there  would  be a change  in  the  ownership  of risk  assets.
The key feature  of Rohatyn's  plan is interest  relief. DCMAC  bonds
would carry a fixed concessional  rate (6 percent  was proposed  at the time)
that  would  be passed  on to the  debtors  whose  debt is  rescheduled.  Banks  that
accept those bonds in exchange for their original loans would incur an
immediate  loss,  due to the lower  present  value  of the revenue  stream  on the
bonds.  As a compensation  for that sacrifice,  they  would  acquire  assets  in  a
better  risk category. They  would also  be permitted  to write  off the  revenue
loss.  For their part, industrial  country  governments  would guarantee  the
agency's  bonds  and underwrite  its potential  debt-service  losses  on the loan
portfolio  it  has  acquired  from  the  banks.
A  final, important feature of the Rohatyn proposal is that the
debtors  would  commit  themselves  to maintaining  debt service  equivalent  to 25
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to 30 percent  of their  export  revenue. This recognizes  the linkage  between
export  and debt-servicing  capacity,  and states  that debt-service  ratios in
excess  of the  proposed  limits  are  unsustainable  in  practice. But,  despite  its
po ential  merits for HICs with severe  debt overhangs  and uncertain  export
prospects, this early plan  shares the  cost implications,  organizational
complexity  and  absence  of political  support  of other  debt  relief  proposals.
The Bradley  "Proposal  for  Third  World  Debt  Management"  (1986)  351
This is a hybrid  and ambitious  expansion  of the Baker  Initiative  It
centers  on annual Trade Relief Summits  that would include  the World Bank,
commercial  banks  and creditor  governments. These summits  would  overcome  the
logistic  problems  created by the fragmentation  of the debtors'  respective
negotiations  with two  separate  creditor  "clubs":  the  London  Club  of commercial
lenders  and the  Paris  Club  of bilateral  official  creditors.
Like Secretary  Baker,  Senator  Bradley  envisaged  a three-year  period
for the implementation  of his plan.  During  that period  consecutive  annual
Summits  would agree to provide  a combination  of concessional  interest  and
principal  relief,  as well as additional  lending. Debt relief  in each  of the
three  years  would amount  to a maximum  of three  percentage  points  off actual
interest  rates  and three  percent  write-off  of all outstanding  commercial  and
bilateral  official  loans,  and to be forgiven  by them.  The actual  amount  of
relief  to  any  one  eligible  country  would  be  negotiated  under  that  ceiling.
Reciprocal  commitments  of debtor  and creditor  nations  would be, for
the former to undertake  domestic  reforms,  and for the latter  to ensure a
better  trading  environment  for  developing  countries. Finally,  as in  the  Baker
initiative,  the multilateral  development  banks  would  have to increase  their
lending  by $3 billion  per year,  over three  years.  However,  recoginzing  that
the  commercial  banks'  principal  aim is to lower  their  risk  exposures  to HICs,
the  Bradley  plan  does  not  provide  for  new  commercial  lending.
In aiming  to provide  debt  relief,  Senator  Bradley's  proposal  is more
ambitious  than the Baker initiative.  It is also more pragmatic  than the
latter. For instance,  the  proposal  deliberately  excludes  new  bank  lending  (as
noted  earlier,  commercial  lending  failed  to meet the Baker  targets),  and  the
suggested  level of debt relief, though limited,  anticipates  the needs of
countries  with severe  debt  overhangs.  This proposal's  main  weaknesses  are its
short time horizon of only three years,  and the budgetary  implications  of
interest  and  principal  concessions  by official  creditors.
Week,  2/28/83,  pp15-18.
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The  Kerry  proposal  (1986)  36/
This plan offers a  more  complex form of  interest-rate  relief.
Senator  Kerry  advocates  the creation  of an International  Debt Program  (IDP),
to  be managed by  the UN's  International  Trade and  Finance Development
Council. IDP  would  relate  debt service  to a given  debtor's  trade  balance  and
combine  interest  forgiveness,  debt service  capping  and  debt  rescheduling.
Debt-service capping would  make  payments a  function of  trade
surpluses. If  the  surplus  is 20  percent  or less  of a country's  exports,  debt-
service payments would be  limited to 20 percent of exports and increase
proportionally,  in line  with the  surplus. For  countries  with trade  deficits,
debt would automatically  be rescheduled  according  to a progressive  scale,
based  on the  ratio  of the  trade  deficit  to total  exports. A deficit  equal  to
20 percent  of exports  would  entitle  the  country  to automatic  rescheduling  of
20 percent  of its  debt,  etc.,  subject  to a ceiling  of 40 percent.
All rescheduled  amounts  would  be capitalized  and entitle  the  debtor
to interest  relief. For  the  first  five  years  all interest  on rescheduled  debt
would  be paid  by the  IDP.  For  the  next  ten  years,  interest  would  be capped  at
3 percent,  with the  remain'er  paid  by the  IDP. Finally  eligible  debtors  would
establish  a reserve  against  future  default,  equivalent  to 10 percent  of the
relief  they  have  received.
A  major  difference  between  the  Rohatyn  and  Bradley  proposals  and the
Kerry  plan is that,  under the latter,  commercial  lenders  would  not suffer  a
loss  of revenue.  Industrial  nations  would fund the IDP's  disbursments  in a
manner  proportional  to the trade  benefits  they enjoy  as a consequence  of the
debtors'  relief.  The difficulty  of gaining  public support  for that cost
feature  is  a major  stumbling  block.
The  Bank  of Nova  Scotia  proposal  (1987)  37/
This is one  of the few  debt plans  made by a commercial  bank that is
also a creditor  to HICs.  It central  feature  is that  the  amount  of interest-
rate  relief  would  be set  so that  debt service  could  be  a "reasonable  burden".
In each case, the amount of relief would be determined  in light of the
debtor's  exports  and GDP.  Relief  would  be granted  equally  by all existing
creditors,  but  would  exclude  trade  credit.
Rather than being forgiven,  the amounts  by which  original  interest
charges  are reduced  would  accrue  to lenders  in the  debtor's  local  currency  at
a pre-agreed  exchange  rate  and would  be available  for  conversion  into  equity
investment  in the debtor country.  Finally,  relief  would be subject to a
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ceiling and  future interest defaults  or arrears would be  covered by an
Insurance  Fund.  That Fund would  be managed  by an existing  multilateral  bank
and capitalized  by commercial,  bilateral  official  and  multilateral  lenders  in
proportion  to their exposure.  The World Bank and IMF would oversee the
implementation  of  the relief pLan, apply the necessary  conditionality  and
commit  themselves  to continued  lending  to the  debtors  concerned.
This  plan  has  several  merits. Local  currency  balances  could  serve  to
promote VDR  through debt-equity  swaps;  the World Bank and IMF would set
surveillance  of  conditionality  criteria; there would  be  a  case-by-case
approach.  Moerover,  it could serve to stimulate  new commercial  lending  by
tying  it to the  disbursements  of World  Bank loans,  and the  debtors  would  have
to  forego  certain interest-rate  concessions if  commodity prices rise.
However,  on the  debit  side  one should  stress  the  risk  of inflation,  caused  by
the  expansion  of the  domestic  money  supply  in  the  debtor  countries.
The  Dornbusch  plan  (1988)  381
This proposal  by a leading  US acae "ic  takes  Nova Scotia's  approach
one  step further.  It advocates that a.  interest payments in  foreign
currencies  be suspended  for  an undetermined  period,  and accrue  instead  in  the
creditors'  favor  in local  currencies.  This  could  ease  the  way  for  debt-equity
swaps,  as local  currencies  could  be reinvested  locally,  but not repatriated.
As a complement,  debtors would undertake  major policy  reforms.  This plan
shares  the infaltionary  risks  of  Nova Scotia's  proposal.
The  Niyazawa  plan  (1988)  391
This second Japanese  initiative  was presented  at the 1988 Toronto
Siummit. Its structure  is threefold  and combines  menu options  and interest
reduction.  First,  debtor  nations  would securitize  part of their  debt,  with
principal  guarantees  through liens on their exchange  reserves  and on the
proceeds  of  the disposal of state-owned  assets.  Second, the remaining,
unsecuritized  debt would be rescheduled  with grace periods of up to five
years,  during which  interest payments could  be  lowered, suspended or
forgiven.  Finally,  multilateral  and bilateral  agencies  would  increase  their
lending  to  countries  that  had taken  the  first  two  steps.
The  main  drawback  is that  countries  with  scarce  reserves  would  not  be
able to provide  collateral  security  for  princiapl  repayments. Eligibility  to
this plan would thus be restricted  to debtors  that  have sufficient  foreign-
exchange  reserves.
4/30/1987.
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Debt  relief  through  the  reduction  of debt stocks
Most debt reduction  plans share  the feature  that ownership  of risk
assets  would be transferred  to an IDF-type  agency, in exchange  for its own
debt obligations. This transfer  of ownership  would sever the link between
private creditors and  official  debtors, and  insulate creditors from any
further deterioration  in  the debtors' creditworthiness,  thus protect the
international  financial  system.
The  Kenen  plan  (1983)  40/
This proposal  was the  first to recommend  the creation of a new
agency,  the  International  Debt  Discount  Corporation  (IDDC),  envisaging  that  it
could  function  within  the  IMF.  IDDC's  capital  would  be subscribed--in  paid-in
or callable  form--by  industrial  countries.  In exchange  for its own bonds,
IDCC would purchase  debt at 90 percent  of face value--a  low discount,  given
today's  secondary  loan prices.  IDDC  bonds  would  have a final  maturity  of 15
years,  a five-year  grace  period  and a yield  tied to US Treasury  bonds.  They
would be tradable.  IDDC  would  reschedule  the loans  it had purchased  to the
same  final  maturity,  buc  with a grace  period  of only  three  years,  and a cost
to debtors  of a quarter  percent  above  the  issue  yield  of the  new bonds. Again
the terms  of the proposed  reschedulings  have been surpassed  by recent  market
practice.
The principal  merit  of Kenen's  scheme  is that,  in being  the  first  to
propose  reductions  of debt stock  faciltated  by a new international,  publicly-
funded  facility,  it  has  become  a "generic  plan". Its  obvious  cost  is  the  need
to  appropriate  public  funds  to  underwrite  IDDC's  capital  and  potential  losses
on the  loans  it  had  taken  over.
Though subsequent  debt-reduction  proposals vary  in coverage and
detail,  they mostly follow  Kenen's broad principles / They generally  also
share  its  costs. For  example,  the  Sengupta  Proposal  of 1988  envisages  an
IDDC-type facility, to  be created in the4  )MF  (the IMF Debt Adjustment
Facility).  Similarly,  the  Mistry  Proposal 2  recommends  the creation  of a
Debt Restructuring  Facilty, to  43be  administered  as a  special World Bank
program.  By contrast, Sachs 43  recommends  purchases  by the World Bank
itself,  in  exchange  for  its  own  bonds.
39/  The  Economist,  8/6/88,  p  62.
40/  Wertman,  op.  cit.,  pp 29-30.
41/  Sengupta,  Arjun  K.  "Remedy  for  the  Debt  Overhang",  The International
Economy,  July/August  1988,  pp.  97-99.
42/  Mistry,  Percy  S.,  Third  World  Debt:  the  Baker  Plan  - Phase  II,  undated
mimeo.- 38  -
The  Robinson  plan  (1988)  44_
This plan is  more ambitious  than its  predecessors.  It combines  debt
reduction  with  voluntary  new lending. The plan's  central  structure  is  a  new
international debt  agency,  the  Institute of  International Debt  and
Development,  (I2D2). I2D2  would  be a joint  venture  of the  World  Bank  and  IMF,
and rely heavily  on their staff.  Sponsoring  governments  would provide its
equity  capital.
I2D2 would negotiate  case-by-case  agreements  with debtor  countries.
If the latter  agreed  to participate,  they would  have to commit  themselves  to
growth-oriented  policies.  All  participations  by  sponsoring and  debtor
governments  would  be completely  voluntary.
With creditor  banks  I2D2  would  negotiate  the  repurchase  of debt at a
discount,  in exchange  for its  own obligations. These  would  be of two  kinds:
floating-rate  perpetuals,  and participating  preferred  stock.  The purchase
discount  would be determined  in light of the  probability  of debt service  by
the debtor, of  the secondary-market  price of  the debt involved, and of
concessions that  are  deemed  approp-iate to  make  debt  service  more
sustainable.  In  return for that discount I2D2 would grant the debtors
"meaningful  concessions"  during  the  adjustment  period.
12D2  would  also  reserve  the  rig  t to subordinate  the  debt  so acquired
to all future  debt of the same borrower,  to pave the way for new voluntary
lending to that country.  However,  both the original  concessions  and the
subordination  could  be suspended  by I2D2  if the  debtor(s)  were  to deviate  from
agreed  adjustment  plans  or to exceed  targets  for new senior  lending.  Given
the  subordination  feature, and  to  avoid  free-rider problems, all  the
commercial  debt of a given  country  would  either  have to be acquired  by I2D2,
or treated  comparably.
In Robinson's  estimate,  up to $250  billion  in commercial  debt of the
Baker 17 would be eligible  for repurchase. Assuming  the total  amount  were
repurchased  at 60 percent  of par, 12D2  would  have to issue  a maximum  of $150
billion  in its  own  obligations,  respectively  as to $125  billion  in perpetuals
and  $25  billion  in  preferred  stock. Assuming  a 10:1  gearing  ratio,  I2D2  would
require $12.5 billion in equity participations  by sponsoring  governments,
either  paid  up,  or callable. Such  capital  would  be kept  as reserve  by 12D2.
One weakness  of this  proposal  is that if I2D2 subordinates  the debt
it has  acquired  from banks,  its  risk exposure  could  be considerable.  On the
other hand, that subordination  would be a "carrot" for new lending.  As
another carrot to promote the enforcability  of this essentially  voluntary
431  The  New  York  Times38,  8/9/1987.
44/  James  D.Robinson  III: (i)"Weaving  a Debt  Net",  The  International  Economy,
May/June  1988,  pp.  50-55,  and (ii)  The  Amex  Bank  Review,  Special  Papers,
No 13,  March  1988,  "A  Comprehensive  Agenda  for  LDC  Debt  and  World  Trade- 39  -
plan,  Robinson  suggests  that bank regulators  treat  discount  from the debt's
face value  as an eligible  reserve in the banks'  base capital,  or that its
write-down  be spread  out  over  time. However,  it is  not  clear  how  a discount--
i.e.,  a loss--could  become  an eligible  reserve.
Robinson proposes to deal with free riding in  two ways.  Non
participants  would  either  be offered  low-yield  exit bonds,  or be  mandated  by
regulators  to  mark  the  loans  concerned  "to  market",  without  the  benefit  of the
special reserve treatment or  spread write-downs the  participants  would
enjoy. But,  as the  proposed  inclusion  of discounts  in the  banks'  reserves  is
questionable,  that  part  of the  stick  loseri  some  of its  "clout".
The  UNCTAD  plan  (1988)
This proposal  was set out in UNCTAD's  Trade and Development  Report
1988,  and calls for across-the-board  debt reduction.  UNCTAD starts  from a
medium-term  baseline  scenario  for the  Baker 15,  and recommends  once-and-for-
all debt forgiveness  of 30 percent of the commercial  bank debt of those
countries  (equivalent,  in UNCTAD's  escimate,  to 25 percent  of their total
debt).
Simplicity  is the  principal  advantage  of UNCTAD's  approach:  the  banks
would act directly  to make write-offs,  without  the intermediation  of a new
debt facility. However,  this  does not taz-kle  the questions  of enforcability
and free riding,  except  through  burden  sharing  with the  debtors  (the  prosed
discount  of 30 percent  is far below average  market  discounts  of around  50
percent). The  cost  of the  proposed  forgiveness  is estimated  to be compatible
with  the  banks'  exsiting  provisions.
The sole  condition  to be imposed  on debtors  would  be to allocate  the
entire  amount  of interest  savings--estimated  at $10  billion  in  the  first  year-
-to investment  in export industries,  so as to generate  additional  foreign
exchange  when exports  grow.  Domestic  consumption  would  only  expand  later,  in
line  withe  GDP  growth.
UNCTAD estimates that debt  forgiveness  of  that magnitude would
immediately  raise income  growth in the Baker 15 to 7.2 percent,  and that
average  growth  of per  capita  income  over the  next  five  years  would  reach  3.1
percent,  or 2.5  percent  more than in  the  baseline  without  forgiveness.  These
projected  growth  rate are substantially  above the World Bank's  "high case"
scenario,  presented  in the  1988  World  Development  Report
The  Gorbachev  plan  (1988)  4
This plan was announced  at the occasion  of President  Gorbachev's
speech  to the  UN General  Assembly  on December  7, 1988. Besides  a declaration
of intent,  that  the  U.S.S.R  would  institute  a moratorium  of up to 100  years  on
Growth".- 40  -
its claims  on the least developed  countries,  this plan also addresses  the
problems  of HICs.
For  the  latter group of countries the  Soviet proposal endorses
UNCTAD's  debt reduction  plan.  It also  recommends  that  debt service  payments  by
HICs be a  function of economic performance  and that, in selected  cases
extended  (but not specified)  payment  deferral  be given on major  portions  of
debt.  Finally, this  plan  expresses support for  "market agreements"
(presumably  VDR) with industrial-country  guarantees.  It also supports  the
establishment  of an IDF,  if needed.
Though laudable, this plan may  be  somewhat disingenuous.  The
U.S.S.R.  is a major debtor  in its own right  and its Foreign  Trade  Bank  has
only  a very  limited  risk  exposure  in  HICs.- 41 -
VII.  Conclusions
Proposals  to increase  official  and commercial  lending  to the HICs
have received widespread support.  Some are  already being implenented.
Japan's  recycling  plnn is in force;  the  World Bank's  recent  capital  increase
will enable  it to expand  its own project  and program  lending.  Through  co-
financing  programs,  direct  guarantees  and  other  techniques,  the  World  Bank  and
its  affiliated  institutions,  IFC  and  MIGA,  are expanding  their  catalytic  role
to stimulate  commercial  lending  to selected  HICs.  Risk hedging  is  also  being
implemented  on a selective  basis. A small  number  of  developing  countries  have
already introduced interest  and  currency swaps in  their debt management
programs.
By contrast,  official  circles  in industrial  countries  and commercial
creditors  have, so far, shunned the idea of interest  concessions  or debt
forgiveness  to HICs.  For  governments  the  major  obstacle  is the  potential  use
of public  funds  ("tax  payers'  money")  to  finance  debt  concessions  directly,  or
to protect  their  domestic  banking  systems  against  the  financial  impact  of such
concessions. For their part, the banks fear that large-scale  "nvoluntary"
debt reduction  would involve  excessive  losses  and write-offs. If these  were
to exceed existing loss provisions,  capital-erosion  could affect the more
highly  leveraged  banks.  Finally,  both official  and market  circles  point  to
the risk of moral hazard  by debtors,  meaning  that formal  concessions  could
become  a "reward  bad conduct",  thus penalise  countries  that have persevered
with  adjustment.
Arguments  against formal  debt concessions  to HICs have also been
bolstered by  the  fact that  recent breakthroughs in  market-based debt
strategies  have  already  managed  to prrovide  some  of degree  of debt  reduction,
thus relieving some of  the  tension associated with the  debt  overhang.
Voluntary  debt reduction  is gaining  wider acceptance  from commercial  banks
and, as shown  by Brazil's  debt rescheduling  agreement  of late 1988,  there  is
an emerging consensus in banking circles that VDR need not preclude  new
lending  to the  same  country. A further  major  breakthrough  in this  field  could
be provided  by the  Brady  initiative  46/  of  March  1989. This  new  initiative  by
the US government  actively  promotes  the expansion  of VDR.  To support  and
encourage  action by commercial  banks,  the initiative  recommends  regulatory
changes--including  a three-year  waiver  of sharing  and  negative  pledge  clauses-
-to provide  banks  with the necessary  flexibility  in their  negotiations  with
debtor countries.  It also provides for the use of IMF and World Bank
resources,  as collateral  on future (presumably  lower)  interest  payments  by
selected  debtors.
These  recent  developments  point  to the fact that there  are  at least
as many reasons  to reject  interest  and/or  debt forgiveness  as to support  it.
45/  The  New  York  Times,  12/8/88,  p.  A16.
467  This initiative  by US Secretary  Brady  was  announced  on March  10,  1989. As
this  paper  was  written  befor  the  announcement  of that  initiative,  it  could  not- 42 -
However,  it is also increasingly  apparent  that  the  main arguments  against  any
form of broad-based  debt concessions  to HICs--beyond  voluntary action by
commercial  creditors--are  political  and ideological.  Political  opposition
comes  from  the industrial  countries'  reluctance  to tackle  the  sensitive  issue
of appropriating  public  funds  for debt relief  in an environment  of budgetary
austerity. Ideological  objections  are that  a "market"  problem--debt  recovery
by private commercial  banks--cannot,  or should not, be resolved  with non-
market  means.
Both  arguments, however,  tend  to  gloss  over  the  increasing
politicization  of the  debt problem  in the  debtor  countries  themselves. Tardy
or insufficient  adjustment  can no  longer be ascribed solely to economic
mismanagement. In several  Latin  American  HICs--especially  in the new, often
precarious  democracies  of  that continent--political  opposition to forced
domestic  austerity  and budgetary  compression  is often  the main cause  of the
governments'  vacillating  commitment  to socially  taxing  adjustment.  At the
same time, being seen to take a  strong stand against foreign commercial
creditors  can  be politically  expeditious  to  defuse  mounting  domestic  tensions,
even if it proves financially  ruinous  in the longer  run.  Peru and Brazil
offer  good  examples  of such  ill-fated  attempts.
So far the creditors  have managed to remain  one step ahead  of the
debtors. Banks  have trimmed  their  exposures  and accumulated  large  provisions
to  lessen their vulnerability  to potential defaults; the  evolving debt
strategy  has become sufficiently  pragmatic  to recognize  the need for more
wide-spread  VDR;  as isolated  crises  flare  up in individual  debtors,  industrial
countries  and  multilateral  agencies  can step  in with sizeable  emergency  loans
or commitments  to lend--most  recently  to Mexico  ans Argentina.  But, even
though  the international  financial  community  has been willing to raise the
stakes  as and when needed,  after seven  years the debt strategy  has not yet
moved  beyond  the  realm  of crisis  management.
The outcome  is still  fraught  with uncertainty,  especially  now that
some Latin American  debtors  are attempting  to revive  the idea of a "debtor
cartel".  If that should  happen,  or if social  and economic  problems  were to
become  even  more  pronounced  in  HICs--for  instance,  in  the  event  of a new  world
recession--crisis  management  may no longer suffice.  It will then become
obvious  that  a purely  political  decision  is  needed  to  remove  remaining  hurdles
in the path of formal,  involuntary  debt forgiveness. In fact,  the  amount  to
be forgiven  under such  conditions  could turn out to be higher  than if more
timely  action  had been taken.  The current  S&L crisis  in the United  States
shows  only  too  well that  delayed  action  can  be  very  costly  indeed.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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